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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Investigation of November Events Runs Into Puzzles

90EC0258A Prague ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY in Czech
26 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with Eva Joachimova and Lubor Kohout, members of the Independent Investigation Commission, by Jan Subert; place and date not given: "Two Mysterious Deaths"]

[Text] Mysterious deaths, unexplained attacks against unsuspecting individuals, missing persons, intentionally damaged automobiles—those are some of the findings made by the Independent Investigation Commission, which is trying to verify "on its own" many serious phenomena directly or indirectly related to the dramatic events of November 1989.

The Independent Commission was organized on 24 November 1989 in response to initial distrust to the official investigation of the events of 17 November; it is composed of students' representatives and members of the civic initiative movement. Although at present this group already maintains good contacts with the office of the military prosecutor and with certain deputies to the Assembly, it remains independent. Two of the members of the Commission, Eva Joachimova and Lubor Kohout, answered our questions.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] I know that you are particularly interested in checking out the cases of missing persons who may have been directly involved in the events of 17 November. What is the outcome of your investigation?

[Joachimova/Kohout] In cooperation with the sector of the CSR Ministry of the Interior assigned to search for missing persons, and with the Federal Criminal Center at the CSSR Ministry of the Interior, more than 60 cases of disappearances have been reviewed. At this time, we do not have any evidence that a single person is missing in direct connection with the events of 17 November.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] And how about the possibility of deaths...?

[Joachimova/Kohout] We reviewed every route taken by the ambulances as well as admissions in every hospital and pathological clinics, in an attempt to find out where and in what condition had the wounded been transferred. Thus far, however, we have not confirmed a single case of death related to the demonstration.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] Therefore, is there still any purpose for your Commission to continue its investigation of the November events?

[Joachimova/Kohout] Indeed there is. We have available a number of testimonies about cases where individuals who lay prostrate on Narodni Avenue were dragged in the direction toward the GDR cultural center. Here end all their traces. All we know is that no civilian ambulances took them

to have their injuries treated; based on their descriptions, we were unable to find them among the hospitalized wounded persons. We must therefore continue our search.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] It has been rumored that you are also investigating certain cases that may not be directly related to 17 November, but that still deserve special attention....

[Joachimova/Kohout] For instance, the disappearance of Mr. Kalis, an employee of the Kotva department store, remains unexplained. About a week before 17 November, as he was leaving for vacation, he said that he would participate in the demonstration. No one has seen him since. There are some allegations that he is in Austria, but there also are certain peculiar circumstances that we must follow up.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] There are many questions about the death of Jan Jelecek, a student of the Department of Natural Sciences at Charles University.

[Joachimova/Kohout] This is another case we are investigating. On 15 November 1989, Jan Jelecek, a resident of the town of Trebic, was found near a forest not far from the community of Pekna u Volar. How he got there is a mystery. All we know is that he disappeared and died under extremely strange circumstances. His corpse was immediately placed in a coffin, a public funeral was banned, and when the people from the Civic Forum in Trebic tried to find out what had in fact transpired, they were constantly shadowed. At the same time, it is known that Jelecek had been very active in the ecological and student movements. There are some reports that he had in his possession certain tape recordings and photographs from the August and October demonstrations, but the tapes disappeared when he died. We turned over this whole case to the General Prosecutor of the CSR; an exhumation and further investigation will follow.

The circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Engineer Samec also remain unclear. He was involved in the Civic Forum. He was seen last at one o'clock at night on 6 December. From that moment his whereabouts remained unknown until 17 January when his body was pulled out from the Vltava River near the Public Swimming Pool in Prague. It is not known how he got in the river; Eng Samec's family completely rejects the possibility that he might have committed a suicide. Because there are additional discrepancies here, we shall follow the process of official investigation.

[ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY] Have you ever encountered any attempts to obstruct and frustrate your independent investigation?

[Joachimova/Kohout] There were quite a few. In November and December we received scores, even hundreds of red-herring reports, disinformation intended to mislead us. As a "warning," three of our automobiles were damaged; in one of them we found the hose connected to the brake slashed. Another car was lent to us, and when we were on our way to return it to its

owner, a Tatra 603 automobile which was following our car for 20 km "bumped" into our car. This year such "warnings" stopped.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] Are you willing to report again to our editors at a later date?

[Joachimova/Kohout] Certainly, we'll be glad to.

Former Red Berets Member Talks

90EC0282A Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech
31 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with former OZU member by (tt); place and date not given: "I Do Not Understand What Could Have Happened to Them"]

[Text] The shadow of the events of 17 November 1989 still envelopes our society. An ignominiously well-known role was also played here by members of the Special Purpose Section of the FMV [Federal Ministry of the Interior]. Because of the veil of secrecy which still covers this armed element, the most varied information and rumors about it are circulating among the public. This interview is an attempt to bring at least some concrete facts into the entire affair as provided by a former member of the OZU [Special Purpose Section] who, for understandable reasons, does not wish to be named. Similarly, the names of other specific persons whose activities are directly connected with the OZU are left out of the interview.

[MLADA FRONTA] Just how does a person even get into such service?

[Former OZU member] I want to say first of all that it is not possible to volunteer for it. Individuals are selected according to certain requirements and then an offer is made. In my case, the work was offered after I completed my military service, but also, of course, after passing demanding psychological and physical tests. But at the time I still did not know what it specifically involved.

[MLADA FRONTA] Can you give us any details about what your training was?

[Former OZU member] It was exceptionally demanding in all aspects. It lasted about a year and during that year we had to complete several courses. These included a pyrotechnics course in Martin, a diving course, and also a mountaineering course in the Tatras. The best specialists in each field, most of them specialists of state elements, trained us. We constantly improved in our capabilities and underwent testing every six months. The emphasis was placed to a large degree on expert training in close combat, that is, hand-to-hand combat. Part of the training was also directed at operations against aircraft hijackers. These exercises took place at the Ruzyně airport using special equipment. I would like to stress at this point that during the time of my active service (the first half of the 1980's—author's note), we never trained in deployment against the unarmed public, that is, for an operation such as the one on 17 November of last year.

[MLADA FRONTA] Then what was your mission?

[Former OZU member] To take action against drug dealing, antiterrorist measures, and in especially dangerous criminal activities.

[MLADA FRONTA] Who could give the order to commit you to action?

[Former OZU member] Only the government of the CSSR had that authority and nobody else was authorized to give such an order, at least that is what they constantly told us.

[MLADA FRONTA] Are you willing to describe the organizational structure of your unit in more detail?

[Former OZU member] The facts that I am giving you are several years old and date from the time when I served with the unit, so today they may be somewhat different. At that time our unit was named the Special Purpose Unit and came under the 14th Directorate of the FMV, an element of the State Security. The unit consisted of six teams of 12 to 15 men each. Each team had a commander, a deputy commander, six to eight riflemen, and the so-called specialists who were experts in explosives, diving, and mountaineering. The specific designation of these functions was "senior specialist in charge," which is the job title used in the State Security. The entire unit had roughly 80 men. There were always three teams in readiness which rotated every 14 days, after which they had four days off.

[MLADA FRONTA] What were relations like within the unit, especially interpersonal relationships?

[Former OZU member] About that I can say that at first there were no problems in that regard. We did our job gladly and were fully committed to it. We were primarily proud of our professional skills. I would stress that the emphasis was mainly on our specialist training and I never felt that there were any attempts to manipulate us. Our commander devoted all his efforts to us and we liked him. The fact is that his direct superior, the commander of the 14th Directorate of the FMV, did not have the best relationship with him. When one of our members was seriously wounded by a grenade fragment in an exercise in the Sumava Mountains, the UZU [Special Purpose Unit] commander was removed from his job despite our protests, since it was not his fault; it seems to me that this affair was not the direct cause of his removal because there were often injuries, but they were never the cause of changes in cadre personnel. After the new commander came in, there started to be some negative effects; the professional level dropped and training was not how it had previously been. A year later another commander came on board, from the VB [Public Security] Readiness Regiment. After he arrived there was a further decline in the professional level, the commander tried to introduce the organizational principles of the VB PP [Readiness Regiment], there was a period of administrative stagnation, the emphasis was placed mainly on theoretical training and political education. A number of members got

out and the new ones who came in were not subject to such demanding testing as we had been. Several months after that I left.

[MLADA FRONTA] Why did you leave and did you not have problems with that?

[Former OZU member] There were several reasons. The relations in the unit had started to bother me and family problems also played their role. Moreover health difficulties had started to show up. As I already said, the service was very demanding and selected members of the UZU were committed to operations outside the country for short periods as well, where there were great psychological stresses and a number of incidents. But I do not wish to speak about this in any more detail. It is true that I had a number of problems with getting out and it took almost a year before I succeeded in leaving. Like they told me, employment laws do not apply to us, so I had trouble finding new employment.

[MLADA FRONTA] Later did you feel there was interest in you?

[Former OZU member] Yes, I had suspicions and they were also confirmed, but considering my former employment I was not surprised. After all, I had to sign an agreement to keep silent for a period of three years.

[MLADA FRONTA] A last question. How do you see the events of 17 November and particularly the involvement of the OZU unit?

[Former OZU member] When I found out about it, it was literally a shock for me. I do not understand what could have happened with them since all the members of that unit while I was serving in it clearly were aware of their mission, and in a case where they were misused they could become a very dangerous force. We were therefore directly subordinate to the government and emphasis was therefore placed on a high level of moral training. It never even occurred to me that our enormous potential power, directed against matters of the most dangerous nature, could be turned against defenseless people. I consider that a common crime and it should be punished as such. Once again I say that I do not understand what could have happened with them that such an elite unit could become the tool of some despot. I do not understand, but I am ashamed of it.

People in Provinces Said To Fear Soviet Troops

Environment Despoiled

90EC0280A Prague ZEMEDLSKE NOVINY in Czech
27 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by F. Lauer: "...and They Have No Respect for Nature!"]

[Text] At the very start of our trip to Klasterec nad Orlici there was a letter, actually a copy of a request addressed to the CSSR governmental commissioner for matters

connected with the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in this country. It was written by the chairman of the MNV [local national committee] in that town and signed by practically all the residents of this picturesque village in a beautiful corner of the Orlicky Mountains, a corner literally created for recreation and relaxation, but...

Lately people have not been crowding in here. The reason? Since 1968 a Soviet garrison has been located here. "It is really unbelievable how they treat our forests, fields, and nature in general," writes F. Olbrich and continues "After 21 years of them being here, the citizens in a six-kilometer radius get to harvest practically none of their vegetables and fruits. Likewise there is probably no summer cabins which has not been visited several times by uninvited Soviet soldiers."

The letter contained other shocking facts as well about the behavior of our uninvited guests, including breaking our laws. Is it really this way, we asked ourselves and so took a trip to see how things are right at the spot.

"Do not think that what I said in the letter is anything new. Look at the bunch of complaints and various requests which I have collected since I started this job in 1986," F. Olbrich said to us in his outer office while pulling out a great stack of various correspondence. "We attempt to resolve the citizens' complaints, but it is not that easy. There are problems not only with the Soviet command, but also with our agencies. Many times when we were getting down to the meat of things I was called aside and after coming back I learned that top officials of the OV (okres committee) of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] had been here and had reached an agreement with the garrison command. Mostly it was not to our benefit!"

Klasterec nad Orlici is located in a protected area of the Orlicky Mountains. Not far away is the Pastvinska Dam, which is included in the recreation zone. Streams flow here as well in which not only petroleum products but also sewage appear, and we looked for those responsible. It did not take a lot of work to find them. It was the Soviet garrison! Corrective action is harder to accomplish. Yesterday there were supposed to be discussions called by the department of forest and water management, agriculture, and the environment of the ONV [okres national committee], but their results will not have much effect on correcting what has been allowed to go on for years.... "Of course, this is not just our problem by a long shot. Take a look at the roads. The shoulders are completely impassable, many times up to 20 meters wide, and so they use the normal roadbeds which we must then repair at great cost. And the worst thing is that many times they bring their vehicles out on the highways and are not at all interested in the fact that people have to get to work. Finally, they usually have morning road marches," we learned further.

We also discovered that in the housing, right next to our citizens, we cannot speak of any hygienic standards being maintained and there are problems which arise

from the situation where there are more Soviet soldiers and family members than there are inhabitants in the village. "The worst is with the supplies and then the 'premature' harvesting and stealing from cottages and apartments. To say nothing of the shopping. The Soviet women have their mornings free and can stand in lines and buy up desirable goods."

Around Klasterec there are also forests and in them there are not only unauthorized buildings, but also animals that roam the woods, and that leads to another serious problem. The Soviet soldiers, or rather the officers, hunt without regard to our laws. They use snares, submachine guns, and even dum dum [hollow-tipped] bullets.... They take no regard even of the mountain sheep which are being raised in this area.

It is hardly worthwhile to mention the unauthorized acquisition of agricultural land which we would have been happier to lease to them for a time, the construction without permission, or the continuous damage done to the nature which is under protection of the law. The governmental commissioner General Major Eng Duchacek also responded to the letter and his answer did not greatly satisfy the citizens.

Civilians Murdered

90EC0280B Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech
27 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "A Cruel Gift of Friendship"]

[Text] "There used to be, but not after they started shooting here!" The citizens of Klasterec nad Orlicí answered our question in this and similar ways when we asked whether friendly relations were maintained between the local populace and the Soviet soldiers.

We obviously will not find out the truth here today. Some of the local people say that it was an accident. Others that it was a deliberate act. The fact is that on the night of 1 to 2 January 1983 a Soviet soldier used a submachine gun to shoot the chairman of the MNV [local national committee] Frantisek Toman, who was 51 years old at the time, and his wife Vlasta, who was a year older. The murderer apparently fled from the guard detail. According to the description passed down the former chairman had gunshot wounds to the chest, medical diagnosis E 969. His wife had a fatal wound with a diagnosis of E 965. Such are the brief facts.

We talked about the details with local witnesses. None of them gave use his name. Since the shooting here there have been other mysterious fatal woundings in the area and people are afraid. This is not changed by the answer of the government commission General Major Eng Duchacek that the murderer of the Tomans was punished with the greatest penalty!

"Frantisek was a good man. He had very good relations with the Soviet soldiers and the main officers. One has to recognize that there were very good people among them,

the same as now, but..." we were told. Naturally we tried to search out more information, but the answers were always the same: it does not pay to have close friendships with the Soviet officers. Even the death of the MNV chairman is put in this category. A few days before the tragic night they say that he sat down with an officer and talked about life over a drink. "At that time he said that the officer told him that for him Czechoslovakia was like America..."

We also found out that people here did not lock their apartments which why there is suspicion that it was murder. The soldier looked in at several windows and supposedly had a plan. Originally he only wanted to shoot the chairman, but his wife came out behind him. The fact remains that the bullets went through the door behind which an old woman was standing. Luckily none of them hit her. The result was the death of two people; four children, two of whom are minors, were left without parents....

There were also problems with the burial. The okres national committee and the party agencies did not want to allow a church funeral and proposed a civil ceremony instead of a funeral. The grandmother did not agree, however, nor did the priest and so the funeral finally took place in the church. Of course, there was a great number of State Security members there. "We were afraid to speak to each other. We did not know who was behind us and who was listening. But a lot of people came!" We heard this everywhere we went.

And one more thing. "We know that even now there are some decent people here, but what does that do for us. We are afraid. We know that the officers' wives are desolated over preparations for their return. They will not have any place to live. Of course, we did not invite them here...."

Agrarian Party Publishes Its Program

90EC0292A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech
1 Feb 90 p 11

[Article by Eng. Frantisek Trnka, Sc.C., university lecturer and chairman of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party: "Economic Program of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party: We Want a Free and Meaningful Life in Our Countryside"]

[Text] Our intention is to participate in a free, abundant and harmonious development of our country. We want to produce food in sufficient amounts and good quality at prices the consumers can afford. Our desire is to have attractive, well kept villages and hamlets, and to bring back to our countryside a friendly and happy lifestyle without drudgery and haste.

It is generally known that the world has left us behind, particularly as concerns advanced labor-saving, more efficient technical equipment. We can learn a lesson from the progress abroad: We must work very efficiently and every hour at work must be productive. Let us

abandon all hope that we shall get something for nothing. To buy what we need, we must work and produce goods suitable for export. Or we could get credit. However, our older farmers know full well what it means to be deeply in debt.

Even if we work very hard, it will take us at least three years—and possibly even longer. With that in mind, we do not want to make any promises that cannot be fulfilled. We do not curry instant popularity. We aim at long-lasting, and I should like to add, enduring prosperity.

The human potential is almost unlimited. Nevertheless, people must be given a chance and opportunity to be free and to create.

Our ideas and actions are based on democracy, on the government of the people. For that reason, it is not our intention to win at any cost; we want to gain the favor of our voters by telling them the truth and by our realistic approach to the solution of economic, social, ecological and cultural demands. In agreement with these views, we present here for consideration our views about the solution of fundamental issues of the future development, particularly as concerns our primary agricultural production.

Cooperative Agricultural System

At present, the unified agricultural cooperatives are the strongest and numerically the largest economic factors in the countryside and therefore, we must first of all consider their future. These enterprises produce most of the foods that provide nutrition for our population. Despite all its shortcomings, our nutrition is pretty good. Thus, we think that we must preserve whatever is good in this particular form of production and try to improve what has never been good and what is obsolete.

Naturally, it would take a short time for us to liquidate all existing unified agricultural cooperatives. That would not be difficult. It would take only a few sufficiently aggressive individuals in each enterprise to split the management and sooner or later to ruin the cooperative economically. We can succeed in that. However, every radical restructuring reduces productivity, and lower productivity necessarily leads to problems with supplies in the market—in other words, to national economic problems. We cannot yet afford to import foodstuffs that are in short supply.

Moreover, we must realize that in a few years we would have to rebuild again those ruined mass-production structures. It is indisputable that all over the world agriculture, especially its essential sectors supplying food for the population, are leaning toward mass production. Our views and wishes may differ, but they can do nothing to change this fact. We could rebuild our mass production on the foundations of private ownership. That is possible and in all probability, there will be such instances, although I think that over the long years of the cooperative system of management, our agricultural

workers got accustomed to certain social guarantees and social equality. Therefore, as the cooperative movement is spreading in advanced European countries, the cooperative system will probably remain the predominant form of production also in the Czechoslovak agriculture. We must be aware of that. What should be done for the development of the cooperative system in the nearest future? Cooperatives are not a communist invention. Communists organized the current JZD's [unified agricultural cooperatives] by force, according to a pattern that did not tolerate any deviations. And that was their fundamental error.

For that reason, we must bear in mind that unified agricultural cooperatives, as we have known them over the past 40 years, cannot operate anymore. It is obvious that in the future cooperatives will be considerably diversified; their area, organizational structures and various types of production will differ. As cooperatives, they will focus not only on primary agricultural production, but also on processing, storage and marketing of food products. In brief, they will be very diversified enterprises and supply quality food to our people.

For those as well as for historical reasons, we should not insist on a general term (unified agricultural cooperatives); their designation should be chosen according to their primary focus. Their title should include a single common denominator—cooperative. The change of their name is also warranted from the historical point of view. The word "unified" conjures memories of the involuntary organization of cooperatives after the promulgation of the law on the unified cooperative system which mixed together all kinds of village cooperatives whose members became automatically members of the unified agricultural cooperatives.

Above all, it should be borne in mind that the agriculture of the future will encompass various types of enterprises, especially, enterprises of different sizes, from the largest to the smallest. All those enterprises should cooperate among themselves. It is quite easy to imagine that a large agricultural enterprise, let us say, a cooperative, will cooperate—collaborate—with a number of smaller enterprises specializing in certain types of production. The large enterprise will supply them with the means of production and guarantee that it will buy, package, process and market their products.

Naturally, this economic cooperation must be as advantageous for the small enterprises as for the large ones, whether they are cooperatives or managed by the state. If it will not benefit the small enterprises, they will find another partner or establish their own enterprise with a similar type of production. There is no other way in the free world. This precisely guarantees that the economically stronger enterprises will not arbitrarily manipulate the small ones.

Small enterprises, especially those in private hands, will have a dependable program of production and guaranteed sales, costs of their means of production, and prices

of their products. Therefore, the large cooperative enterprise and all members of that cooperative will assume a certain risk of potential marketing problems.

On the other hand, this arrangement is just as advantageous for cooperatives in general. They will have the assurance that they can procure sufficient amounts of products for their processing plants and that they will sell all their products at prenegotiated prices. A cooperative of this type will be a necessity of life for all participants who will be on an equal footing as members or partners, and who will share both the benefits and potential risks of their ventures.

Furthermore, one must take into account that the areas of cooperative enterprises will also differ, from the truly gigantic ones to tiny enterprises. Small enterprises should specialize in a certain type of production and enter into some kind of cooperation with large enterprises. Here applies what was said about small private enterprises.

In order to achieve a high productivity of labor, our production needs both steady inputs of modern technology and technical improvement. Technical improvement is very costly as it requires major investment funds. Small enterprises cannot afford such an expense because their funds are insufficient and, therefore, large enterprises must take this task upon themselves. They may do so by pooling their resources (by turning into a cooperative of cooperatives), or a large enterprise of a cooperative, private or state, may assume this role.

Furthermore, some cooperatives should be gradually converted into joint-stock companies because only very few of their original owners are still working in them; their current members are in fact mostly employees who have not contributed any property to the cooperative. In that case, it would be appropriate to reinforce the feeling of ownership in the cooperative, and therefore, shares and joint-stock corporations seem to offer an advantageous arrangement.

To recap these considerations, we may say: no stereotypes, but diversity, versatility, various forms and flexible approaches—simply, freedom of enterprise but also very disciplined entrepreneurship.

Problems of State Farms

State farms pose a knottier problem for solution, but here again we must proceed from the fact that we want to introduce in our national economy market relations and competition. In conditions under which they will be gradually implemented, those will survive who will earn their living, make profit, and produce enough goods for consumption and development.

It is true that in most cases our state farms have failed to do so. We said on several occasions that we believe that the employees of state farms are not to be blamed for such a state of affairs. These farms had to take over inferior and marginal lands and unprofitable enterprises,

act as complementary suppliers of food products, and produce at any price, because costs did not matter, only the volume of production was important; no enterprise can prosper under such circumstances.

However, this situation is changing and will continue to change. For that reason, these particular conditions must be immediately reviewed and solutions sought so that our state farms may turn into profitable enterprises.

State farms may be divided and private farmers or cooperatives may farm their lands, but if we consider the acreage managed by state farms and the numbers of agricultural workers, and compare them with the numbers of workers willing to start working under such difficult conditions, we shall come to the conclusion that in all probability, this idea is quite unrealistic.

It may be assumed that some of the acreage of the state farms will be managed by private owners—farmers. However, it is hard to estimate today how large that part will be, but I repeat: In view of its remote location and difficult conditions, we cannot expect that this land will be recolonized by members of our nations and nationalities.

What solution then may be offered to state enterprises? It will not be easy to find a solution and introduce an efficient system of management. We think that the first problem to deal with is the independence of state farms and their opportunity to choose their range and their form of management. In the past, the government created large agglomerations which had no chance of developing successfully.

To put it in no uncertain terms: We are not opposed to large state enterprises. We have already presented the reasons why such enterprises have their place in our national economic structures. But we are against enterprises that are created artificially and, therefore, inefficient.

A large enterprise must be the outcome of the economic development. It should be organized because it is economically advantageous, because people can manage it well, and because they know the reasons why it should operate. However, very few such enterprises were organized in the past in the state sector.

Many problems will be resolved when enterprises can determine their area and the structure of their production, particularly because the disproportionately huge, inefficient units will cease to exist. Thus, a major part of unprofitable costs will be reduced; furthermore, if the state farms can set up their production plans, they will choose a structure of production that is suitable for their area, that can be accomplished by their work forces and material equipment, and thus, that will be the most profitable one for the given period of time and for the given area.

A considerable opportunity for cost cutting may be found also in the structure of the management of state enterprises. Thus far, state enterprises have been run according to orders from above, and, therefore, quite

incompetently and with little regard for different local conditions. For that reason, state farms should become completely autonomous; if they should be accountable for the results of their management, they must be given the opportunity to make independent decisions about such results.

As concerns the financial management and distribution of earnings, state farms should follow the fundamental principle that payments to the state budget be as high as necessary for the state to cover public expenditures, and that the rest of funds remain available for the use and development of the enterprise.

A certain drawback is the fact that the Czechoslovak koruna does not always have the same value, and that funds cannot be transferred according to the needs of the development of the enterprise, but according to a rigid stipulation that spells out what part of their assets may be used for each specific purpose. These regulations considerably hamper the development not only of the state farms but of all agricultural enterprises. If state farms could have sufficient funds available for their development, then they would be able to pay more attention to social issues and thus, to provide stable conditions for their essential personnel.

Another important role in the development of state farms may be played by workers' participation in the management and their share in economic achievements. In time, state farms should be converted into joint-stock companies. Stocks should be issued and sold to employees, and thus, employees would directly share in the achievements of the management, and furthermore, stocks would be purchased by other citizens and organizations, for instance, industrial enterprises, processing companies, private farmers and other entrepreneurs.

Enterprises should be administered by enterprise councils which should choose the managers of the enterprise whose sole criterion of success will be their economic achievements. Thus, the ownership of the enterprise will be separated from its management, and its management will be independent and efficient.

The objective of achieving good results is not advanced by the "democratic" interference with the management and with the competence of individual managers. Every manager must be granted a sufficiently long, uninterrupted period for the implementation of his strategic plans.

Therefore, we believe that it would be expedient to plan carefully for the possibility of converting state farms to joint-stock companies. Furthermore, it would be very advantageous, for instance, if the processing industry, such as the slaughterhouses, dairy farms, etc., would become part or even the main component of a joint-stock company. In a given area the joint-stock company would organize production, acting as an equal and not a superior partner. Other enterprises established by joint investments of industrial, state and private enterprises could, and should, serve as the integrating factor.

All these problems must be analyzed and assessed in cooperation with agricultural specialists. We are against any situation where some individuals sitting "at the conference table" invent still more worthless plans for a rearrangement of our production. We advocate a thoroughly democratic approach to the solution of such issues.

Attitude Toward Private Farmers

Private farmers, private owners of agricultural enterprises, suffered the greatest oppression during the collectivization drive and after 1968.

We have great admiration for farmers who survived that oppression and continued to operate independently. Lately their situation has improved to some extent, but they are understandably worried that agricultural mass production might crush them; they want to be given the same opportunity for development as is given to cooperative and state enterprises.

The Czechoslovak Agrarian Party declared in its program that it intends to support private farmers. They have every right to ask how can relatively small private enterprises exist next to enormous state and cooperative enterprises.

We are convinced that this is possible and even advantageous for everybody involved in agriculture as well as for our national economy. This follows from the global experience that groups of enterprises of various sizes can exist side by side, and that these enterprises may complement one another. What is lucrative for mass production may not be lucrative for small-scale production, and vice versa. Every scale of enterprise has its advantages. We must proceed from that premise.

Small private enterprises should specialize mainly in production that requires skill and individual attention, and that brings only mediocre results in mass production, for instance, raising of milking cows and special livestock, planting of the so-called small-scale or special crops which demand special know-how and special care, or whose cultivation cannot be mechanized. In addition, they include special garden produce that may be sold directly to the consumer or to partners in the processing industry or cooperatives in which small enterprises will have a share and which will process, package and market their produce. Private farmers will receive a share of the earnings from such operations according to the produce they deliver and according to their share in capital assets.

It should be clear that this is more than a matter of legal protection of private farmers. In that respect, relatively good laws and regulations may be issued, but this concerns primarily the economic security of our farmers and their economic survival or advancement. And this economic advancement may be achieved mainly by their cooperation with large or medium-sized enterprises.

The advantage of small enterprises is the owner's unique relation to the soil and to the means of production; thus,

he works better and with far greater dedication, and responds very flexibly to changing conditions, be they short-term or long-range. Therefore, small-scale production can offset the handicap of using small, less sophisticated equipment, and thus, achieving lower productivity of labor.

We invite the cooperation of all private farmers, both those who are already working on their land and those who will do so in the future. We should like to consult them about the formulation of their program, protection of their interests, and guarantees of their economic and social security. It would be appropriate if within the framework of our party they would organize the Club of Private Farmers, specify their attitudes, be represented in our party's leadership and thus, be assured that their legitimate interests are adequately and effectively protected. If they remain isolated or if they join a weak movement, it is quite probable that their interests will not be promoted vigorously enough. We are interested in cooperation, not in domination—as some of our opponents are trying to suggest to persons working in agriculture. The slogan "In Unity Is Strength" still applies.

The Attitude of the CSSZ to Land and Ownership

At present, the land is owned by the state, by cooperatives and by individual citizens. According to current legal regulations, land which private farmers pooled in cooperatives remains their property. Therefore, it is privately owned by those farmers. Other legal regulations stipulated how to divide the land if a member leaves the cooperative. Of course, those rules have not been widely practiced because for various reasons only very few farmers wanted to leave the cooperatives. Therefore, most lands managed by unified agricultural cooperatives are still privately owned by their original owners. It is true that thus far they could not in fact assert this ownership, that they did not collect rent for their land, and that they could not benefit from any other privileges stemming from their land holdings.

That situation must change. Landowners earned their land by working diligently, saving and sacrificing for many years, and in the end, they actually contributed it for free to the cooperative which has been using it for a long time and is using it even now. Therefore, it would be appropriate—and we shall support a legal amendment to that effect—for land-owners to receive compensation for their land, i.e., to be paid rent, or else their land should be appraised, its owners should be given shares or bonds equivalent to the value of their land, and receive annually their share of the income based on their earnings and on the amount of their shares. Some cooperatives are already practicing this method. No legal regulation prevents agricultural enterprises from following this procedure.

We therefore demand, and will insist, that land remain in private ownership, so that its owners may sell it, naturally, also to cooperatives, state farms or other legal entities, and so that its owners may benefit from their property and derive economic advantages from their ownership.

In addition, extensive acreages of land have been nationalized, expropriated, etc., by various legal measures. Until those issues are resolved, the compensation due for such lands should be paid by the state and not by enterprises managing those lands. The land allotted to them for their use has often been a burden to them. We shall fully endorse a fair legal solution in that sense.

Another unresolved issue concerns legal measures against the so-called kulaks and rich farmers. We have neither proposed nor voted for such laws—and we do not agree with them. Nevertheless, we do apologize for those of our people who are dealing with agriculture. It was an illegal, abominable and inhuman act. We think that these issues should be fairly reviewed and resolved. However, the state which owns those lands must come forward and recompense any losses. We think that, in view of our national economy, it will be very difficult to pay the original owners full compensation for their losses, simply because the state does not have available sufficient funds to settle such accounts. Ultimately, this problem must be worked out over an extended period. Commissions of historians and lawyers must be appointed to discuss jointly how to possible pay for such losses.

Hasty promises that these issues will be resolved may only lead to disappointment because such promises cannot be soon fulfilled. Anybody who makes such promises either does not have honest intentions with the agricultural development or he does not understand laws of national economy. We are aware that every standpoint we shall adopt will be in certain respects one-sided and that is may be contradicted. There is no other alternative. It is always necessary to seek compromises and attitudes that are acceptable for the majority of our citizens. Some groups will not like our approaches. We welcome every initiative and suggestion that will help rectify the sins of the past for which, as already mentioned, we cannot be blamed but which we are eager to settle and solve.

A Word in Conclusion

From our current experience I know that many people are calling for guidelines and clear standpoints, while we present them instead with topics for discussion and with materials that need to be corrected and that are incomplete. This procedure is often not understood, but we think that it is correct, because we want all members of our party, not only its leadership, to formulate the party's policy.

For that reason, I should like to ask you to accept these views as a suggestion for discussion, and to express your opinion about them, so that the resulting program will represent a joint accomplishment of all of us.

Party of Democratic Socialism Registered in Slovakia

90EC0293B Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 2 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Igor Cibula, representative of the Party of Democratic Socialism, by Martin Podstupka; place not given: "First Among the New"]

[Text] Yesterday, the SSR Ministry of Interior and Environmental Protection registered, as the first of the new political parties, the Party of Democratic Socialism. We talked on this occasion with the coordinator of its leadership, Igor Cibula.

[PRACA] We have already provided information about the Party of Democratic Socialism. Nevertheless, maybe you could say a few more words about its goals.

[Cibula] We wish to assist in the forming of an open, democratic society which respects all work that contributes to the creation of values. Our goal is to combine political and economic democracy. We are inspired by the model of the Swedish socialism, for example, but we do not wish to copy it, our aim is to have Slovakia bring its own version to Europe.

[PRACA] How would you briefly characterize the Party of Democratic Socialism?

[Cibula] We are a party of the center left. In our program we emphasize orientation toward Slovak national policy, defending Slovak interests in the federation. We espouse the Socialist International; a week ago our delegation held talks with the foreign-policy representative of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPO) Petr Jankowitz. On Saturday we are expecting a return visit of our friends from Vienna to Bratislava.

[PRACA] You entered political life only recently. What are your initial experiences?

[Cibula] First of all, we are richer by the realization that a new type of citizen is being born, one who cannot be simply presented with generally formulated political slogans and principles. We must take as our starting point the fact that our notion of social justice demands constant reevaluation of what exists. We must address ourselves more directly to laborers, intellectuals and youth, in whom we see the future of the Party of Democratic Socialism.

[PRACA] How are your relations to other political forces developing?

[Cibula] We value the healthy activities of the civic initiatives, we are interested in cooperating with all democratic parties of the political spectrum, particularly with the Social Democracy in Slovakia. A specific example is our initiative, together with the Liberal-Democratic Party, which led to the recent meeting of the new political parties in Slovakia at the so-called small roundtable.

[PRACA] What was discussed at this meeting?

We talked about the fact that basic political questions cannot be solved by undemocratic means. It is requested that these parties be represented at all political proceedings in the republic as well as in the federation. They cannot be left out of the legislative process, they must be provided access to the mass media and guaranteed political and economic equality with the parties which existed before November 1989.

Principal Points From Draft Electoral Law

90EC0302A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech
6 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by (Id): "Excerpts From the Draft of Law on Elections to the Federal Assembly"]

[Text] The coordinating center of the Civic Forum sent our editorial board an excerpt from its draft of the electoral law submitted for consideration to the Federal Assembly on 23 January. In the introduction to the excerpt of the draft of the law, the coordinating center of the Civic Forum says: To the Federal Assembly for consideration. This draft was prepared by a commission of the Federal Assembly under the leadership of Prof. Boguszak. The principle of proportional representation, from which this draft proceeds, was adopted at a round table which the Civic Forum had initially approached with another draft. In our opinion, the electoral system which combines the proportional system with the majority system can better express both the advantages and disadvantages of each of those systems. Experts of Civic Forum contributed numerous suggestions for the current version of the draft; for instance, they recommended that the voters be given an opportunity to indicate which of the candidates they prefer. We omit several paragraphs of a purely technical nature. A full text of the draft will be published as soon as possible. We shall return to the discussion about other possible versions of the electoral law.

The text of the excerpt from the draft of the law:

PART ONE

BASIC PROVISIONS

Article 1

Elections to the Federal Assembly are held on the basis of a universal, equal and direct right to vote by secret ballot according to the principle of proportional representation in electoral districts. Each electoral district consists of approximately the same number of Czechoslovak citizens who have reached 18 years of age.

Article 3

Any Czechoslovak citizen who has the right to vote and who has reached 21 years of age on the day of the election may be elected a deputy to the Federal Assembly.

PART TWO

ELECTORAL TERRITORY

Article 5

Electoral District

1. Eight electoral districts will be established in the Czech Republic, and four electoral districts will be established in the Slovak Republic.

2. Electoral districts consist of the territories of districts according to the situation on the day when the elections were announced.

Article 7

Electoral Precincts

1. Electoral precincts are organized in individual communities for the casting of ballots and for the counting of votes.

3. As a rule, an electoral precinct will be organized for each 1,000 voters. Separate electoral precincts may be created in remote areas of a community if there are at least 50 voters present.

PART FOUR

ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES

Article 13

General Regulations

1. The Central Electoral Commission will be in charge of the elections before the Federal Assembly. District electoral commissions will be in charge of the elections for individual electoral districts; these commissions will appoint their subcommissions in district centers.

2. Precinct electoral commissions will be established in electoral precincts.

4. Electoral commissions are composed of an equal number of representatives of political parties, political movements and groups (hereafter: political parties) which have filed an independent ballot. If the ballot is declared invalid or if it is withdrawn, the membership of the representatives of that political party in respective electoral commissions will be terminated. In case of illness, other commitments or the termination of the function of a member of the electoral commission, the commission chairman will appoint his replacement according to the sequence listed by that political party.

7. At its first session the electoral commission will draw lots to elect its chairman and deputy chairman from among its members. Each official of the electoral commission must be a member of a different political party. The oldest member will supervise the drawing of the lots for offices in the commission.

PART FIVE

DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE SLATE OF CANDIDATES

Slate of Candidates

1. Political parties may file their slates of candidates for elections to the Chamber of the People and slates for elections to the Chamber of Nations. The slates must be presented in two identical copies to the registrar of the

district electoral commission no later than 60 days before election day. With the slate, the political party will file the following:

A) a declaration that it has at least 10 thousand individual members; or

B) in case it does not meet the condition stated under letter A), a petition for candidacy of that political party signed by as many voters as needed to meet the number of individual members. The voter signing the petition will present his citizen's identity card, and will include his name, surname, birth number, and address. The signature on the petition cannot be retracted. The district electoral commission may verify the accuracy of the data about the number of members or the information provided in the petition.

2. If the political party files its slate in several electoral districts, it will present its petition to only one district electoral commission, and then will refer to it in its notifications to other district electoral commissions.

4. The slate of candidates contains:

A) the name of the political party;

B) names, surnames, ages, occupations and addresses of the candidates, and their sequence on the slate listed by Arabic numeral; and

C) the designation of the authorized representative of that political party and his two alternates, with their exact addresses. Neither the authorized representative nor his alternates may run as candidates.

5. In addition to the data listed in paragraph 4, letter B), the political party may also list on the slate the affiliation of individual candidates with a particular political party, or it may state that the candidate has no political affiliation, or that he is independent.

6. A political party may nominate for the elections in an electoral district:

A) no more than 20 candidates for the elections to the Chamber of the People;

B) no more than 15 candidates for the elections to the Chamber of Nations for the territory of the Czech Republic, and no more than 30 candidates for the elections to the Chamber of Nations for the territory of the Slovak Republic.

Article 19

Hearings on Slates of Candidates by the District Electoral Commission

1. The district electoral commission will review the submitted slates of candidates within 55 days before the elections.

Article 22

Copying of the Slates of Candidates

2. Each slate of candidates will be reprinted in the form of a ballot; all slates for the election to the same chamber of the Federal Assembly will be typeset in the same type of print, in the same format, on paper of the same color and quality and of the same dimensions. The ballots will be stamped with the seal of the regional election commission and produced in a sufficient quantity to enable the voters who present their voting registration card to cast their vote without any hindrance.

3. The chairman of the district electoral commission will mail the slates of candidates (ballots) reprinted in this manner to the chairmen of local national committees with the instruction that they deliver the ballots to all voters no later than three days before the elections and to precinct election commissions on the election day.

Division Three

Election Campaign

For the purposes of this law, the period set for the election campaign will begin 40 days and end two days before election day.

2. During the election campaign, each political party running in the elections will be given an equal access to the state media of public information. Radio and television broadcast will make available a total of four hours of air time to each of the parties involved in elections. The broadcast time and its allocation must conform to the principle of equality of political parties participating in the elections.

PART SIX

CASTING THE BALLOT

4. Having received the ballots and an official envelope, the voter will enter the area designated for that purpose (Article 28). In that area he will insert in the official envelope one ballot for each of the chambers of the parliament. On each of the ballots placed in the envelope he may draw a circle around the serial number of no more than four of the candidates listed on one ballot in order to express his preferences for the candidates. He cannot make any other alterations on the ballot. The voter will place the unused ballots in a container designated for that purpose in the partitioned area.

Article 35

Rating of the Ballots

1. Ballots on which the names of the candidates have been deleted, altered or added will be counted in favor of the slate of candidates of that particular political party. Such alterations will be disregarded. If the voter indicates his preference to more than four candidates listed on the ballot, that ballot is counted in favor of that political party, but his preferences will be disregarded

2. Ballots that do not appear on the official printed form are invalid. If several ballots of various political parties competing in elections to the same chamber of the parliament are placed in the same envelope, all those ballots cast for that particular chamber are invalid. If the voter returns his envelope with one ballot for one of the chambers, his vote is valid. If the envelope contains several ballots of the same political party for the same chamber of the parliament, they are counted as one vote; in case of a preferential vote on any of the ballots, that ballot or the ballot where more preferential votes are indicated will be counted.

Article 41

Determination of the Number of Deputies Elected in Electoral Districts

1. The central electoral commission will review the registrations by district election commissions and from them it will ascertain the sum total of votes cast for all slates of candidates in each electoral district in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic separately for elections to each of the chambers of the parliament. It will divide this figure by the number of mandates allocated for that particular republic on the basis of the statewide election figure (Article 6), or in case of the Chamber of Nations, according to constitutional regulations. That will determine the total number of mandates for each republic.

2. The total number of valid ballots cast in each electoral district will be divided by the number of the mandates for that republic. The resulting figure represents the number of the mandates allocated to individual electoral districts.

3. If all mandates allocated to the Czech Republic or to the Slovak Republic are not distributed in this manner, the Central Electoral Commission will assign such mandates consecutively in the same republic to electoral districts which have reported the highest residual [votes]. A lottery will decide in case of equal residuals.

Article 42

Admission of Political Parties to First Scrutiny

1. The Central Electoral Commission will determine the total number of valid ballots cast for each political party throughout the Czech Republic and throughout the Slovak Republic separately for each chamber of the parliament. It will ascertain which political parties have less than 5 percent of the total number of valid votes cast in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic. Those political parties and the votes cast in their favor will be disregarded during the further determination of the election results and allocation of mandates. If a political party presents a slate of its candidates in both the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic, it will be sufficient if it gains 5 percent in one of the republics.

3. In individual political parties, the candidates will be given mandates allotted to the political party in the order in which the candidates appear on the ballot. However, if at least one-tenth of all voters who have cast valid votes for that particular political party used the right of expressing their preferences, the first mandate of that political party will be given to the candidate who is the winner of the absolute majority of votes cast by the voters who availed themselves of the right to indicate their preferences. If a political party was allotted more candidates, and more candidates meet the conditions stated in the preceding sentence, then mandates will be assigned to the candidates consecutively, beginning with the highest number of obtained preferential votes. In case of a tie, the order listed on the ballot will decide. If a political party has failed to nominate as many candidates as it was entitled to according to the results of the first scrutiny, it will be given only as many mandates as it has candidates.

PART EIGHT

MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE ELECTIONS

Article 53

The Prerogatives of the Candidates

1. Each candidate is entitled to be relieved from work by the person who is either his employer or serves in a similar capacity (hereafter: employer) in the period from the day after the filing of the slate of candidates in which his name appears until the end of the day before the election.

2. If the candidate so requests, the employer will reimburse him for the lost earnings.

Article 54

Compensation for the Costs of the Elections

2. Each political party will cover the costs of its election campaign from its own funds, or use credits from a financial institution or savings bank. In its application for credit, the political party will include information concerning its assets and incomes from membership contributions or other resources. The financial institution (savings bank) may demand guarantees from a certain number of guarantors.

3. ... a political party with more than 2 percent of the total number of valid ballots cast in the Czech Republic or in the Slovak Republic will collect from the state budget of the Federation Kcs 10 for each received vote.

Calls for Moravian Autonomy Noted

90EC0318A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Feb 90 p 31

[Article by Jacqueline Henard: "Freedom for Moravia—New Nationalist Sensitivities in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Brno, Feb—Little is left of Brno's old splendor. Gaps in the pavement are as wide as a foot and the facades of old-town houses are disintegrating. The drabness of neglect prevails in the suburbs. For decades all wealth has bypassed the hometown of Mendel, Janacek, and Musil. After the expulsion of the German half of the population, and especially after the centralist communists assumed power, Czechoslovakia's third largest city was reduced to a third-class provincial town.

Now the piper has to be paid. In the past weeks several citizens' initiatives have formed in and around Brno to resurrect its former rank. With far-reaching references to the past, they remind not only of the Moravian-Silesian federal state of the first tripartite Czechoslovak Republic but also of the entire greater Moravian heritage. The largest groups are the "Moravska obcanska hnutie" (Moravian Citizens' Movement) and the "Spolecnost pro moravu a slezsko" (Society for Moravia and Silesia). These two alone already claim a membership of 90,000. A Moravian "charter" was drafted a few days ago and signed by all citizen groups. A solution to the "Moravian problem" is demanded.

The movement has direct links to 1968 when Moravian patriotism first emerged. At that time its strength expressed itself by the founding of several Moravian institutions: Moravian labor unions, Moravian railroad associations, Moravian student associations. The main objective of the Moravians was to make the second Czechoslovak Republic a tripartite country. A federal state was to be created again out of the lands of the Margravate of Moravia and the Duchy of Silesia. There was less resistance at that time [1968] from Prague than from Slovakia, where people were afraid of the new majority that would be created by dividing the former holdings of the Bohemian Crown into two parts.

Disappointed patriots from 1968 are not the only supporters of the new Moravian movement. Members are also recruited from the university. Display windows and doors post bills sporting the Moravian eagle. "The future Moravian nation," explained a student of art history with a straight face, needs a secure place on the map. Moravia should—and about this all citizens' initiatives are in agreement—have its own administration. Several parties, including the Democratic Forum of the Communists, have already incorporated a demand for Moravian autonomy into their platform. The historical boundaries between Bohemia and Moravia should definitely be recognized. The student noted that, when electoral districts for the first free elections were defined on 8 June, these borders were already appallingly violated by the creation of mixed Bohemian-Moravian districts.

Hardly noticed by Prague until now, the Moravians are fighting for their identity. To some extent the new sentiments from Brno and vicinity probably reflect only one of many possible metaphors for deliverance from communism. On the other hand, surprisingly strong emotions surface in discussions about the "Moravian

problem." Cosmopolitan Moravians no longer understand their own countrymen. A lecturer at Brno University maintains that this arrogant, pseudoscientific ethnicity only distracts from the infinitely more important problem of democratization, and that one should again learn to speak Czech properly, as well as foreign languages, to get away from intellectual isolation, instead of giving serious thought to the codification of Moravia. A cultural renaissance would not spring from a return to ethnic art.

In the meantime, a younger colleague is drawing a detailed map of Moravia from memory, showing the regions historically settled by Slavic and Germanic tribes. He grants that there are hardly any Bavarians, Franks, Silesians, or Swabians left and claims that this fact is the reason many citizens' initiatives omitted any reference to the region's Silesian tradition in their names. However, the ethnic German archivist of Tropaup, a certain Karel Mueller, has recently demanded that the future emblem of Czechoslovakia consist of four equally large sections featuring the Bohemian lion, the Moravian eagle, the Slovak cross, and a Silesian eagle.

Since the expulsion [of Germans], the Slavs—Hanaks, Horaks, Slovaks, and Wallachians—constitute an absolute majority of the roughly 4 million people now living in the former federal state of Moravia and Silesia. We have nothing in common with the Bohemians, maintains a man from Zlin defiantly. Moravia is a hilly, Catholic country with very little tolerance for the Prague irony of a Hasek, Werich, or Hrabal. A common Czechoslovak identity is denied. For that reason, the jurist Miroslav Richter, one of the leading spokesmen for the new Moravian movement, gave "Slovak" as his nationality for his personal identification document. In Slovakia one has a better appreciation of Moravian sentiments than in Prague.

Newspapermen Eager To Get American Publications

90EC0282B Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech
24 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by (pl): "Union Council Discussions"]

[Text] The Newspapermen's Union temporary administrative council held its third working session yesterday. The members of the appropriate working groups were tasked with, among other things, working out a definition of "newspaperman" in connection with membership in the union, getting an expert consultation by the Pragokonzult company as to the profitability of economic facilities (Roztez and Hradek), and offering unused spa vouchers to the rehabilitation work group of the Union for others who might be interested. There was discussion of the distribution of the Union Information Bulletin to newspapermen. Council members were informed of the fact that the offer of free delivery of American magazines drew interest in ordering 561 titles out of the total number of 793 offered. The editorial

board ordered a total of 5,059 copies. The Union decided to increase the number of copies in the current order so that the magazines could be offered to additional people interested as well. It was agreed to submit proposals for doing away with the Press Day and the existing newspaper prices to the appropriate state agencies.

Students, Artists Recognized as Political Force

90EC0293A Bratislava DIALOG in Slovak
19 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Article by Peter Karvas: "Why Them?"]

[Text] These remarks have their specific and compelling inspiration. I wrote them at the instigation of people who turn to me. Contemporaries, colleagues, fellow travelers—as well as younger people. They ask me: Why the intelligentsia? Why actors, theatre people? Why young people, students? Why those people in particular!

An experienced and put-upon person would be tempted to give a flippant answer: "They have better vocal cords. They are trained in the art of opposition. They have more future in store for them." But right away one realizes: That answer would be no good. Not only because it does not explain anything whatsoever. Most of all because the truth lies somewhere else. Thank goodness, these are not half-truths, either, which is usually the worst of all.

For more than 20 years I used to put down in questionnaires and biographies: I come from a family of intellectuals. I wrote it with a feeling of inferiority and with the resolve to suffer the consequences of my sin. That was during the time when my friends did not wear hats (elitims) but peaked caps. When an action was under way: laborers from their lathes and farm workers from their plows to literature! We concealed not only our academic titles, but kept our education secret in general. In key documents, basic organizations were divided into productive and unproductive, into factory-oriented and intellectual, into correct and important on one hand and expendable and in fact suspicious on the other.

We studied, to be sure, we committed the act of studying. I am not speaking about "at night by candlelight" as is said over a grave, on the contrary, it was in broad daylight, weeks and months of training with roll calls. We learned things profound as well as not so profound, forgettable as well as not so forgettable. Yes, such things too. I was trained, so to speak, in classic Marxism. So I learned that members of the working class are revolutionary because they are linked, in their existence and every day, with the most progressive production means, with modern machinery with which they work, and work all together, collectively, one fellow side by side with the next fellow, although others own the machinery. I accepted it without reservation and it also applied without reservation—during the time of the industrial

revolution, during the time when factories were expanding and the proletariat, revolutionary proletariat, was increasing in numbers.

Today we live in the midst of a technological revolution. I would not like to substitute the word "revolution" with the word "progress", as has been done for some time with the justification that in our generation there was only one revolution—the October one. For me, even the technological revolution is a revolution, and with long-range consequences, too (particularly for our problem); maybe just the biological one will have more long-range consequences, if humanity will survive long enough in somewhat good health. (After all, there was technological progress in the time of Archimedes, nay, during the time of the Phoenicians or even the Sumerians.)

It is debatable, whether today the wells, rings and inflows of revolutionary spirit are so hermetically reserved for blue collar and farm workers, as they were when their first states came into being. It appears that together with a speedy automation and robotization there is a change in the composition, extent, and qualification of the groups which come into contact with the most advanced means of production, with fully automated factories. It is not by chance that even in Khrushchev's time the term "working and engineering-technical class" was proposed. It seems that a person directing the operation of a fully automated factory, or supervising it, or even just the person who watches over a production line, will have to be a highly educated person, an intelligent and gifted member of the intelligentsia.

Just as for decades we have been forgetting that a man cannot become a Marxist if he had not become an educated person, that one depends on the other, so today we are not paying attention to the fact that the most advanced means of production, among which we are living, or will live, will become, among other things, a source of revolutionary spirit for the intelligentsia, which always identified itself with its technology from the drafting table to the servomechanism. In addition, the production of the future will be much less collectivized than it used to be in factories or at the production line in Putilovka or the Skoda Works. If today we are talking even more often about a revolutionary intelligentsia, which just passed with honors another one of its tests of maturity (just as our working class again passed one similar to it) it is neither *epiteton ornans*, nor *contradiction in adjecto*, nor a simple exaggeration as some still feel, on the contrary, it is inevitable and natural. Moreover, it is proof that we are not talking only about intelligentsia in the field of technology by any means, on the contrary, the intelligentsia in the fields of art, sociology and the humanities in general is not sitting on its hands, but is acting with initiative: its nature and mission is to think.

It is also a condemnation, on grounds of distortion and crude vulgarization, of a concept which even in official documents divided basic organizations strictly into the productive and the unproductive, while the second

group was practically proscribed, even in our main cities where the top institutions of art, education, and culture are concentrated, therefore from the viewpoint of cultural activities first-class, elite institutions (let us not be afraid of that word, we need to be afraid of it only if we think of it in the context of being second-rate). If almost our entire educational system is actually directed at the average and below average talent, if for the past decades average work was officially elevated, rewarded, and praised, if behind the flood, practically a deluge, of scientific titles, even the highest ones, you seldom find any original creative thinking, any pregnant thought, any spark, well, that is the result of this prejudice and this fear of everything that is more advanced. Twenty years ago a man entrusted with supervising the arts exclaimed: "We do not need any brain trusts here!" The opposite is true, and production—and, it goes without saying, also creative work—cannot move on without them.

And when we are then talking about the youngest intelligentsia, about an intelligentsia that is in the stage of becoming and seeing, about students, we need to add to all that not only the old and persisting, but also the newly arisen factors. Among the old ones belongs, it goes without saying, the inherent antagonism between parents and children, which at a certain point coalesces into rebellion among the youth unencumbered by the conventions and bad habits of the decline, not bound by old wrongs and guilts and reactions to them, educated in the knowledge and progress of a younger generation, and with a yearning to broaden it and put it into practice. Among the newest ones are the experiences with specific parents of the past 20 years, the discrepancies between their words and their actions, faith and professed belief, between the viewpoints of the school and the home, the public and the private, between the proclaimed and incessantly repeated truths and the morality of everyday life. The breakdown of morality which was torpedoed by the routine of hypocrisy, also proved to be as rebellion-inciting and inspiring an experience as were the social injustices of burgeoning capitalism. Getting to know the spiritual and ethical parameters of society and social conscience bore bitter fruit even in this respect. What is more, the young will never forgive us for allowing ourselves to be governed by, among others, people who were obviously—let us put it this way—not of outstanding intellect. By eminent lowbrows.

I remember communists in the time of my youth as people who were very pure and self-sacrificing—or at least that was the ideal they strove to live up to. They turned over their representatives' salaries to the party, for example, whereas in the past several decades they have been increasing them so self-confidently, openly, and recklessly that it had to upset even the most faithful adherents. In my young days, to be in the party meant an excessive amount of work, responsibility and discipline; recently, however, it meant the generally acknowledged, leftist-oriented, formal condition for having a career and a good life—not for nothing do the prognosticators expect a decline in the membership as soon as this automatic condition disappears; when I was entering life, the best brains, talents,

personalities tied their fate to the party, and then 20 years ago the party drove from its midst half a million of the most mature members, so that today there is practically nobody to defend it and represent it in a dialogue which is so much called for. (When I talk about my young days I must, to be sure, add that somewhere Stalinist crimes were also taking place, about which we did not hear and talk at the time, and about which I have written in the LITERARNI TYDENIK. And with which the tragedy of the movement began.)

It would be an unforgivable naivete and illusion if we did not keep in mind that in the coming generation of leaders and innovators there are as many opportunists and careerists as there were in any other, not excepting ours, and that indeed many a yesterday's radical normalizer is riding the wave of revival and innovation in full sail. As far as generational intolerance is concerned, it seems that today we are feeling and suffering, so to speak, more than a normal dose of it. The only thing to be said on this point is that not only will this phenomenon have to be given attention but that it will have to be done in time.

Finally, as far as actors and the eloquent role they played in the 10 days that shook our country, the answer is the most simple, natural, even almost elemental one: They, alone among artists, are schooled in and used to addressing a responding crowd, they alone work in a group, have a workplace with a staff. If writers went on strike hardly anybody would notice or realize it (on the contrary, not a few from among us abstain from work from time to time even without a political reason); it is the same thing with sculptors or composers, they create among their four walls where there is no way to observe them. When an actor or a music ensemble leaves the stage, that is a protest that can easily be seen; it is an outcry. A famous writer can be ugly, a painter can be a dwarf, when an actor speaks up he knows how to address you, resoundingly and suggestively, he has an imposing presence and beautiful enunciation—and if, on top of that, he is also a thinker, then he has your heart.

Our actors, growing and living in a lasting confrontation with the nation, not only were created by God for their mission, in some instance they stepped to the forefront. That spoke to us, and we bow to that.

In conclusion, an observation: Why did I try, seemingly without context, to answer these questions? Because a pessimistic prognosis has been spreading like a contagion: The ruining of the existence of more than half a million relatively educated, thinking, conceptually creative people is a wound on the bodies of these nations which cannot be healed in one generation. Those who bleed do not create, they are neither architects nor builders. It became obvious that it was a wrong assumption. New warriors appeared, the call was answered by young people who are fruitful in ideas and able to express them, pass and lay the building bricks and infuse them with spirit. They have been maturing right in front of our eyes, and they have our confidence, respect, and trust.

Raising General Level of Competence Advocated

90EC0262A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
Dec 1989 p 3

[Article by Milos Zeman: "The Forecasters' Autumn"]

[Text] We are still sitting in a falling airplane, even though the pilot has a nicer looking uniform. Some people have been changed, but the rules of behavior and of maintaining uncontrolled power have not changed. And even if these people were changed ten times, the investigative commissions sat continuously, and SANOPS [expansion unknown] was given over to a child, as long as the rules of play have not changed, our happy revolution has not won.

There is only one true path to the future and that is free elections. This is not one of five, 10, or 15 requirements established; it is the alpha and omega. Those who until recently governed everything themselves eagerly raise their hands in favor of constitutional changes and condemn the excessively zealous police lieutenants. Free elections, however, would be their condemnation and today's former rulers are doing everything they can to prevent them. We need only emphasize the necessity of thoroughly preparing for them and afterwards determining that the preparations must be even more thorough. The emphasis which is placed on free elections possibly differs in the opposition. But this is not a bowl of lentils which can be exchanged for firstborn status. Otherwise the transition official government could again become a temporary feature of a long-term nature. If you state the timing of the elections, you thereby say the period when our falling will stop. And do not forget that each additional month of this fall means one more year necessary for use to get back up.

The programs can also take shape only in the process of preparation for elections and only the electoral campaign will uncover the potential of the desperately lacking politicians, a profession which was exterminated in this country. Such preparations can start already today and will be a transition to that detailed, hard political work of the Masaryk type. The energy which is created in the society does not drain away, but is transformed into systematic pressure. Components of that pressure should also be immediate local elections at places of work and in residential areas, especially where the recent days of truth have demonstrated how far the leaders are from those being led. The strike committees are also a precursor of future free trade unions. If not us, then who? And if not now, then when?

Free elections will thus be the first crossroads of possibilities at which we will decide on subsequent directions. Until now a catastrophic scenario has been played out and its continuation is still realistically possible because the creators of the catastrophe are still in power. Even if political democracy and a market economy appear in this country, we will have to go through another test. The fall will be stopped, but the path back upward is not automatic. We will have to decide whether we want to

rejoin the club of industrialized countries where we once were. If we decide positively, it will mean saving and self-denial. A large part of our earnings will have to go into loans, for example, in stocks; not to the state, but to the organizations where we work. We thus will become actual co-owners, but we will spend a number of years at a substantially lower level than we have been living. The well-known saying that things will have to get worse in order to get better applies to us here as well. We cannot finance the return to the top from foreign sources and a society which does not create enough of its own resources does not have anything to do at the top in the final analysis.

If we decide negatively, from the short-term standpoint we will have a more comfortable life. Of course, we will remain a newly obsolete country which does not get any farther away from the club of the advanced countries, but also does not get any closer to it. In any case, however, that decision must be made in the immediate future. We are approaching the point of no return and after we pass it there will no longer be anything to decide upon because the resources for catching up will stop being sufficient and catching up in the meantime has gotten farther away. This decision will involve on the one hand national pride and on the other the continuing tendency to live at the expense of the future, but also the unwillingness of some politicians, albeit democratic, to extend their considerations beyond the next elections.

The resources acquired should be invested not only in resolving the disastrous situations of today. The forecasters have already warned us enough about ecological or economic catastrophes and now reality itself warns us sufficiently. Now we must warn of the approaching catastrophe of qualifying skills. In the information society of tomorrow, qualifications will be the main production factor. In the last 20 years we have declined in the share of expenditures for education in the national income from 22d to 72d place in the world. This is a cultural massacre which is more than comparable with the massacre on Narodni trida Street, even though afterwards there were visible traces of blood. If we do not inject the resources freed up into an extensive training program, we will be like generals preparing to fight the last war. It is appalling how little attention is paid to education in the various program documents. The forecasters should in this sense be usefully irritating even to the Civic Forum. By the way, those who say that there is no money and the resources freed up from defense expenditures must go into health care forget that we will also free up resources that until now have been invested in the activities of the repressive elements. It would be fair and it would be a recognition by the forecasters of the importance of the students' phase of this revolution and their frequent contact with the repressive elements if the skill training program for today's and future students was cofinanced from these resources.

At one time I tried to explain to Miroslav Stepan in the LIDOVE NOVINY that the intelligence of political representatives is measured by the distance to which

they are able to see the results of their decisions. The intelligence of a people is measured the same way. I do not want any more of the warning predictions to come true. The only forecasting possibility of how to prevent our own warnings from coming true consists of communicating those warnings and fears. So, after the summer warnings, I have also given warnings for the autumn. The most beautiful autumn that I have seen so far in my life.

POLAND

National Allegiance of Silesians Discussed

90EP0362A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC
in Polish No 5, 2 Feb 90 pp 1, 17

[Article by Teresa Bochwic: "Opole Silesia: A Home for All (The Electoral Slogan of Prof. Dorota Simonides)"]

[Text] "We had coffee at my home after the last electoral meeting in May of last year. Osmanczyk looked at me, "If something happens to me, you must replace me. You are at one with Silesia." [Simonides]

A couple of months later Edmund Osmanczyk, the senator from Opole, was no longer alive. Professor Dorota Simonides was hardly in any hurry to fulfill his political testament. She had already her fill of work as a Sejm deputy. But finally she made a decision under the pressure of circumstances, and also at the request of prominent Silesians, such as Bishop Alfred Nossol, who reminded her of her duty to serve the Fatherland.

There Still Are Silesians in Poland

The "Peerel" [acronym, as pronounced, for the PRL, Polish People's Republic, here used derogatively] had succeeded in getting rid of the native Masurians [so that they no longer exist as an ethnic group] but there still remain some 320,000 native Silesians in the Opole region with its population of more than a million. Roughly speaking, these Silesians can be divided into three groups: those with Polish orientation, those with German orientation, and, lastly, simply Silesians, natives. Until recently the last group was in an overwhelming majority.

A great and oft-repeated mistake of Poles was to expect that Silesians would unequivocally define themselves as Poles and become Polish patriots. The inhabitants of Silesia liked to cause problems even to ethnographers, because they always remained Silesians regardless of the language they used; besides they retained their tremendous attachment to the Old-Polish dialect, which they still use nowadays. They had belonged to Poland in the Middle Ages when statehood was a fluid concept. In the mid-14th century they were ruled by Czechs and later by Austria, and, in the mid-18th century, they were subjugated by Frederick II the Great. Prussian reign and German settlement began.

Depending on the vicissitudes of fate the Silesians had in turn to prove their Polishness or their Germanness. They

did this in order to keep their homes—"My Fatherland is what I see from my window." When asked about his native country, every Pole will answer, Poland. The patriotism of Silesians is more local. Of the Silesian school pupils polled, one-half named the locality they or their relatives were inhabiting, 20 percent named Silesia, and fewer than 5 percent Poland. One pupil declared that his native land is German Silesia.

Armed with their faith, customs, love for native land, and a dialect called locally the mother tongue, the Silesians constituted such a strong ethnic group that they had no difficulty in absorbing newcomers, whether Czechs, Poles, or Germans. After 50 years of Prussian settlement, two-thirds of German settlers in certain counties adopted Polish as their native language. Toward the end of the 19th century a Prussian minister of education raised alarm about the threat of the Polonization of Germans in the Opole region. The Silesians, of course, also absorbed German language and culture. There were mixed marriages. Everyone was subjected to Germanization: schools, offices, the army, and factories, all were Prussian. A majority spoke Polish at home, but entire generations were practically bilingual.

After World War I they were to stay in Germany but chose Poland. Silesian uprisings erupted. The plebiscite was won by the Germans by having everyone born in Silesia return from Germany. As a result of another uprising, the Katowice region was incorporated in Poland.

During the Hitler period people spoke in German at home, even with children. After the war the oldest generation spoke only Polish, the youngest German, and the middle was bilingual.

"I remember the family reunions in my childhood," said Prof. Dorota Simonides. "They each were attended by some 20 people. Some supported Wilus and others Pilsudski. Some went on Sunday to hear the mass in German and others to hear it in Polish. But toward the end of each reunion Grandfather said, 'Children, remember that the family matters most. Now let us pray together!'"

To this day Silesians have preserved their customs: the Advent wreath, walking with a bear, palm crosses, the drowning of Marzanna [a straw puppet symbolizing winter, drowned in the spring, an ancient folk custom]. It is a Silesian tradition to have weddings only on Tuesdays and Thursdays, although no one remembers why, and no one works on Saturday afternoons to honor the memory of the halting of a plague thanks to prayers to St. Urban, which took place several hundred years ago. The local customs include a religiosity that is markedly stronger than among Poles, along with plainness of speech and manner; other elements of the quotidian ethos are loser to Germans than to Poles: law-abidingness, orderliness, thrift.

In 1945 the entire Silesia returned to the Motherland, and there was a chance that Poland would regain not

only it but Silesians. Unfortunately, subsequent events, such as treating Silesians as Germans and distancing them from influence on local affairs, have resulted in a situation in which nowadays we may keep Silesia but without Silesians.

In 1945 Poland rode into Silesia on Soviet tanks. The victorious Russians viewed Silesia as conquered territory and its inhabitants as Germans, without differentiating among them. They burned villages, raped women collectively, and deported nearly all males of age 16-65 from many localities. As eyewitnesses recall, the wells were jammed with the corpses of farmers. Entire industrial plants were transported away. Factories were dismantled, and even cable was pulled out of the earth. Also grabbing their share of the plunder were Polish "szabrownicy" [looters]—the first contact with Poles.

Immediately afterward the authorities vetted the local population and deported nearly all Germans as well as those considered German. This was followed by Polish settlement. The population of the Lvov region was resettled here; they were transported to Silesian territories in entire villages. They viewed the Silesians as Germans, because their speech was rough, and because they knew the German language. It used to happen that a Polish family was settled on a Silesian's farm and when subsequently he was identified as a Silesian and not a German, he was given another vacated farm but yearned for his old farm, now managed by a Pole. That was not a good foundation for concord among neighbors.

The "Peerel" authorities stoked local antagonisms with special premeditation. Important local posts were staffed with Zagłebiaki [natives of the Dabrowa Basin], with whom the Silesians traditionally feuded, and often with ordinary bandits. The local authorities were obligated to implement the so-called re-Polonization. All the vetted and approved inhabitants were given Polish citizenship by fiat, and fines were imposed for speaking in German, which encouraged denunciations. Incredible as it may seem, until quite recently there was a prohibition against teaching the German language in schools in Silesia! Traces of the German language were being destroyed. All books, including even dictionaries and textbooks, were indiscriminately confiscated. Inscriptions and road signs were demolished, and homes searched. The more zealous inquisitors smashed vessels bearing German inscriptions, such as "Salz," and even destroyed tapestries embroidered with Gothic letters. Persons whose names and surnames sounded German to the authorities were forced to change them. Calendars, common in other regions of the country, were prohibited if they contained such names as Rudolf or Wilhelm. The Committee of the Citizens of Opole Silesia which was formed in Krakow in 1945 was never transferred to Opole. In Silesia the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] exercised a strong influence, and the dissolution of that party also affected Silesians.

Locally the Silesians are nicknamed "Hanys" or "Gebels" and the newcomers "Khazyay" (from Russian

for "Khozyain" or farmer/boss) or "Gorol." "Gebels," however, has a more pejorative connotation.

The "Peerel" imported the entire Communist mess with its incompetence and wastefulness. The Silesians thus associated the proverbial "polnische Wirtschaft" with Poland as a whole. The newcomers from the east hardly could impress the Silesians by their cultural level, besides. A Silesian housewife washes windows once a week and paints the entire house with good German paint every spring. Having been rejected for years, the Silesians did not understand the struggle being waged by the Polish opposition [to the Communist regime] and viewed strikes as tomfoolery and loafing. It was only after 13 December 1981 [imposition of martial law] that they understood that Poles and the PRL are not the same thing and began, e.g., to participate in masses said for the fatherland.

After 45 years of life in the PRL the status of the Silesians is the same as in German times, as surveys indicate. They are workers and peasants, sometimes artisans, and their educational structure is even worse than in the past: Eighty-four percent of persons of age 40-50 have a vocational-school education, and only three percent have a higher educational background (compared with 11 percent of the new settlers). One of the obstacles to education is loyalty to the local dialect.

How the "Peerel" Bungled the Issue

After 40 years of communism Silesians, choosing between two evils, prefer to be Germans. They have forgotten the bad things; they remember the orderliness and see the prosperity and growth of civilization [in the FRG]. For years there has been an exodus of Silesians to the FRG, although over there they are regarded as... Poles. For many years they had fought in [Polish] uprisings and opted for Poland, but now they are emigrating for the sake of prosperity, normalcy, a life of peace. As for that often being an illusion, that is another matter.

For more than half a year, the so-called "List of Persons of German Origin" has been circulated in Opole Silesia. It was initiated by Johann Krol and his son, Henryk Krol [here spelled with one "l"], of Gogolin. Last summer the 100,000th signature was celebrated, and at present more than 250,000 signatures have been collected on that list. Henryk Krol advocates organizing the German minority in Silesia. At first he claimed that he himself is German, but now he says he is a Silesian with a pro-German orientation. When accused of turning Silesians into Germans, he claimed that most Silesians are Germans who previously could not admit it.

Why Are Silesians Signing the "List"?

Some of them actually consider themselves to be German, although ethnically it could be proved that only a few are. In this case, it is a fatherland by choice. Even now Glogowek is called "little Berlin" in the Opole region. In Kolonowski the local inhabitants petitioned for a German-language school and for the celebration of

masses in German. The Curia is receiving requests for prayers in German and planning to introduce them. Once a week a mass is said in German on St. Anne's Mountain. The sanctuary there is the Silesian Jasna Gora. It is Germans and not Poles who are, unfortunately, associated nowadays with civilization and prospects for a good life.

Many people, especially the uneducated ones, are signing the list without quite understanding what they are doing. Quite a few submit to community pressures; they do it because the entire village has done it.

There is also another and perhaps most important reason. "A person of German origin" is, according to the ruling of a tribunal in Karlsruhe (as reflected in Article 116 of the German constitution) anyone who was born on German territory within the boundaries of 1937 and his offspring (certain Laender have confined this definition to persons born before 1945). Being greatly disappointed by the Polish reality, Silesians want, just in case, to have the option of emigrating to Germany. If the abovementioned article is deleted from the FRG constitution, that chance may vanish. The list is periodically verified and dispatched to the German embassy in Warsaw. People fear that, unless they sign it, they will lose irretrievably the chance to gain German citizenship. If they think in these terms at all, it is our own fault alone. Let us not hide our heads in the sand; thousands of ethnic Poles have in recent years bought or stolen German documents in the Recovered Territories and emigrated as Germans to the FRG. It is difficult to reproach the Silesians for also emigrating since the documents are their own and quite legal.

The scale of this phenomenon is surprising and troubling.

The Numbers of Germans in the Opole Region of Poland Are Growing

Among the Polish population the following three attitudes are being observed:

—They [the German minority] finally showed their faces.

—In general, there is no such minority; it is all a fraud.

—An attempt at a rational assessment of the trend and of its significance to Poland.

So far either the existence of a German minority in Silesia was denied at all (that having been the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or it was reckoned at from several to several-teen thousands. But the list has more than 250,000 signatures and is the basis for applications to register the German minority. Henryk Krol has founded the Sociocultural Society of the German Minority. The matter has already reached the Supreme Court, which has postponed its ruling until the

end of January. In the meantime, the Gliwice Sociocultural Society of Inhabitants of German Origin has been registered. There are many such inhabitants, but are they the German minority?

When the problem of staffing the Senate vacancy left by Osmanczyk arose, the Solidarity Regional Board considered five candidates. Unfortunately, not one of them was a Silesian. In mid-December Krol suddenly notified the Board of his candidacy. "We could not agree to it," said Czeslaw Tomalik, a member of the Opole Regional Board, "not because Krol represents the German minority but because in the past he had not been associated with Solidarity in any way, whether organizationally or in terms of the ethos he professes." On the contrary, his father was a high local party functionary, decorated with the order of Builder of the PRL. In those times he filled in the nationality part of questionnaires with "Polish." At any rate, Solidarity could not sponsor him.

Krol did not see any problem. In his program he stated, "I want to represent those who say of themselves, 'Jestem Slazakiem, ich bin ein Schlesier.'" He believes that Silesians should not be persuaded that they are Polish since they feel themselves to be German. He recognizes the existing Polish frontiers and does not intend to separate Silesia from Poland: the best proof is the very term "minority," which can exist only in the presence of a majority. He wants an Europe without boundaries, and he wants to stop the exodus of Silesians and build their fraternal bonds with Poles. "There is no need for Poles to continue to associate Germans with fascism. If elected to the senate, I shall fight against all nationalisms, primarily German, but also Polish." He also thinks that Ms Simonides represents a program close to his: Silesia can only be the beneficiary. "Our cause has already won, because it forced Solidarity to nominate a candidate representing Silesia."

Professor Simonides resolved at the last moment to stand for the electoral primary. She bested her Solidarity opponents by an overwhelming majority of votes. As a result, there are now four candidates for the senator from Opole: two Silesians, Prof. Simonides and Krol, as well as Jozef Pietrzykowski, who is sponsored by the OPZZ [the formerly regime-supported All-Polish Trade Union Alliance] and an independent craftsman, Jerzy Bobrowski. It is difficult to tell whether they are serious competitors of the two Silesians.

Not all Silesians with pro-German orientation support the Krols and their list. At Dziergowice near Kedzierzyn has arisen an opposition grouping led by Wilhelm Kycia, which faults Krol Senior for having accepted a "Peerel" decoration (Builder of the PRL) and both him and his son for having written "Nationality: Polish" in questionnaires. "He is a painted fox, two-faced; if he is a German, why has not he been a German before?" Others say that the election of Krol would be an insult to Silesians.

Nearly every issue of SCHLESISCHE NACHRICHTEN, a periodical of Silesian landmen's associations in

the FRG, contains mentions of Johann Krol and Henryk Krol, and in every issue politicians appeal for the return of Silesia to Germany. This is no "Peerel"-style propaganda scarecrow. The landmen's associations find no support in the enlightened circles of the FRG, and many Germans voice their concern over the fact that only aggressive revisionist periodicals pay attention to the German minority in Silesia. Krol has no compunction at being photographed in a periodical of German chauvinists with a copy of the "list" and granting interviews to it. At the same time, he fails to avail himself of this tribune to ask for the recognition of the frontier on the Odra and Nysa by the FRG. The landmen's associations are merely at the extreme right wing of German nationalists. And yet, the German state still has not recognized the frontier on the Odra and Nysa as final and inviolable.

Perhaps we may yet live to see a Europe without boundaries, but in the meantime we would prefer to live in a country with guaranteed boundaries. This is particularly crucial in view of the coming reunification of the two German states. Poles have plenty of reasons for a reserved stance toward Germans. But as for the population of the Opole region, at present it simply is afraid. Professor Simonides put it this way: "Since so many Silesians identify themselves with Germanness, this has to be respected. But those who live in Silesia and work here should be loyal to the state of which they are citizens. As far back as in the 14th century, when they still did not speak German at all, Silesians stressed that they were Prussians. This was their declaration of loyalty to the state in which they lived. The Polish Republic has the right to the same loyalty."

But if Silesians are really to be kept on their land and helped to be Silesians again, without national orientations, they should be offered something. Above all, they will [they should? vague phrasing—translator's note] participate in local governments and become, for the first time in years, headmen and councilmen in their localities. Perhaps a university will be established in Opole? Prof. Simonides sighs, "I would so much like to have a good time with them during the electoral campaign, remind them of old folk customs, but I have to repeat to them, 'Let's stick it out, endure somehow....'"

Importance of Catholic Press Viewed; Reader Support Urged

90EP0357A Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI
in Polish No 3, 21 Jan 90 pp 1, 7

[Article by Piotr Wojciechowski: "Let's Not Let the Catholic Press Perish"]

[Text] The peril is obvious. The effects of two great upheavals are overlapping and adding up. Poland is living through the most radical, hasty, and most risky economic reform, a reform that has not been carried out by any other country. A reform unprecedented in the entire history of our country. This is the first upheaval.

At the same time, after a 50-year struggle against the totalitarianisms menacing us from the West and East, we are beginning to recover our domestic and external national sovereignty. The society is beginning to govern its state through a system of democratic representative bodies, and the state is beginning to define its policy toward the Allies, Europe, and the world, independently and in accord with the interests of its society. This is the second upheaval. Both upheavals are an expression of the society's will, and for both the society paid the price with its victims; what is more, the society continues to be solidary about paying the huge price of regaining a balanced economy and political sovereignty. The peril to the Catholic press is precisely associated with that social cost. Yet, can the society afford peril's slide in the direction of disaster and annihilation?

During the 50-year "defensive war" Catholic faith was a wellspring of strength and inspiration to a majority of Poles. The church served as the spiritual, material, and institutional bulwark of strivings for national independence. The church paid for it with victims and persecution; this is being remembered. It is harder to understand that the church's participation in the strivings of Poles for liberation has caused it harm in the domain of nonmaterial values. The thinking of the laymen and the clergy has in a way become politicized, as have the relations between them. Many laymen and clergymen have acquired the "besieged fortress" complex, meaning that they have rather been prone to act in order "to save the [national] substance" rather than to be open to the needs of people, particularly to the needs of those coming from afar.

The situation is changing abruptly. The cordon of hostility and menace encircling the church is cracking, and the burden of political service—of representation, mediation, defense—is being lifted from the church. The insulted and injured now may seek to obtain redress also without the church's help.

At the same time the reform is causing the society to become destitute and hence also the financial situation of the church, which supports itself from offerings, to worsen. The church's entire economic activity must now take place in the conditions of market forces, competition, and inflation. This is complicating the construction of ecclesiastical buildings and various educational activities such as youth camps, spiritual retreats, and pilgrimages, and in addition it is quite adversely affecting the situation of the Catholic press. The miserly but relatively cheap allocations of newsprint, whose price is rising several hundred percent, are ending and the costs of printing, transportation, and distribution also are rising.

The prices of periodicals must rise, but the wallets of the readers are growing lighter. What is more, the times when nearly the entire press was "theirs" while only the Catholic and underground press was "ours" are over. Nowadays nearly the entire press is "ours," and many independent and legal periodicals are attracting a growing readership owing to their renowned columnists,

well organized letters-to-the-editors sections, highly effective ombudsmen, spirited reportage, and the presentation of exhaustive and topical information. The publication of more and more periodicals is being announced, including also major dailies with differing political orientations.

In such a situation can the Catholic press withstand the competition? Can we stand fast?

Or perhaps the question should be worded a bit differently: is the Catholic press worth saving? In the new situation, is it needed by Poland? Is it needed by the public? Is it needed by the church? The answer is, yes, it is needed.

It is needed more now than 30 years ago, than 5 years ago, than yesterday. Let me try to prove this.

The English writer and thinker Clive Staples Lewis stated in his essay, "Participation": "Making Christianity the private affair of the individual while at the same time condemning every manifestation of private life would in practice mean eliminating it forever from our world." Lewis wrote it thinking of the English society of half a century ago, but his words apply perfectly to the totalitarian policy of the Communist rulers of Poland. The greater were their defeats in the field of the physical curtailment and eradication of religion, the louder they demanded that religious faith be the private affair of individuals. At the same time, they were effectively collectivizing everything—work, culture, recreation, entertainment, education. It is untrue that for us totalitarianism is now past history, that we had overcome it on 4 June 1989 [elections]. Those 50 years have enslaved our awareness and our subconscious, deformed schools and families. And we do not know how many dozens of years will be needed before we regain the bonds that used to link us and catch up in our mentalities with the church's fleeing time, ecumenical time, community time, that is, both societal and Eucharist time.

The desiccation of faith in the herbarium of the "private affair" is not just associated with Marxism. The liberal [Western] mass-production and mass-consumption society is hostile neither to religion nor to the church, but its mechanisms and mythologies do not leave too much room for them. Our economic reform must avail itself of the rules of the game elaborated by the modern countries of the West, but precisely this magnifies the need for a new dynamic spreading of the Gospel so as to restore the balance at a new higher level of public welfare. The more there are reasons nudging people away from the road to the temple, to the catechism room, to the spiritual retreat, the more the church needs means of reaching people on the street, in train stations, in waiting rooms, at homes of friends. The Catholic press will not be replaced by even the best homily, the most interesting religion-oriented part of a TV program, or even a book. The church is for heathens. It is to go among them and announce the good news to them, announce the liberating truth. The church of the temples, catechism rooms,

and spiritual retreats spreads the Gospel among those who already are believers; this is greatly needed. Thanks to the Catholic press the church has an opportunity for "going among the crowd" and there looking for guests invited to the Banquet. It is easier to reach for a daily, a weekly, or a monthly periodical, than to cross the threshold of a temple and ask questions of a priest. Moreover, the Catholic press affords every believer an opportunity for apostolic action. Not everyone is gifted with gab, but one does not have to be golden-tongued in order to pass on to a friend a printed sheet and say, "I found something that might be of interest to you."

Complete Christianity is collective Christianity. Great religious experiences may be the lot of an anchorite or a mystic praying in concealment, but they can just as well be the lot of crowds participating in mass religious festivities. There exists, however, a gap between a great religious experience and the plenitude of Christianity, the faith tried by the litmus test of sagacious action rooted in love and truth. For the overwhelming majority of the Polish Catholic community faith is experienced as a form of crowd participation. In his essay "Culture is Faith" Andrzej Kijowski states, "Poles, whose religious ignorance is best known to their pastors, and best known to each of us so far as our own ignorance is concerned, manifest their religiosity together with their nationalism and are the more zealous the greater the numbers in which they gather, because it is as an unanimous crowd sharing the same feelings that they experience religious inspiration and are carried on its wings.... Acknowledging the religion of their fathers or neighbors, they do not consider its meaning: they are ready to defend its material existence, to rally round it and display its insignia, demonstrate their faith in it, but they remain quite ignorant of its truths, principles, or even moral essence." This is blunt speaking, and it was bluntly written by Kijowski 8 years ago, but it does not contain much exaggeration. See if you can find a clergyman or a layman who has succeeded in transcending that religiosity of the crowd and hurling the gauntlet at ignorance. See if you can find persons building communities which desire not only to be aware of the principles, truths, and moral essence of the faith but also to act in consonance with the Truth. For the most part such persons are precisely the readers of the Catholic press. It helps them to improve themselves and familiarizes them with the experiences of others. A good pastor, a preacher laboring to speak in tongues, and a lay Catholic activist all are alive in their dialogue with the Catholic press, in a kind of communion of thought with those whose writings are published in it.

This great help in the formation of a communal Catholicism responding with action to the signs of the times, should not become missing. The Catholic press is the only platform for the constantly improving dialogue among different groups within the church. It is through the Catholic press that the church gains in self-knowledge and that "church awareness" mentioned so much by John Paul II in the conclusion of his adhortation "Christifideles laici" is developed. Church awareness contains not only the feeling of a common Christian

dignity but also the feeling of belonging to the mystery of the church, the communion, representing the fundamental and decisive aspect of the life and mission of the church.

It is precisely through the mediation of this press that dialogue and friendship are established among bishops, curates, clerics, professors at Catholic universities, and secular Catholic activists, and curious aspects of the faith of unbelievers are illuminated. They have nowhere else this opportunity for encounters. Through the Catholic press alone they not only encounter each other but also, what is more important, develop a common language for communication.

Since that is so, the reader would think, the bishops should generously fund the growth of the Catholic press. They should buy better printing plants and a lot of newsprint and hire the best editors, reporters, and columnists. Since this press is so needed, let it grow. And since it is so valuable and interesting, people will buy and read it—provided, of course, that it is priced sufficiently low, because of the general destitution. Such thinking is unfortunately nonsense and only the last word, "destitution," is applicable to the present. Or perhaps even that word is not fitting here considering that we should bear in mind those who are really dying of starvation.

Thus, help from the reverend bishops can hardly be expected; if they can spare anything, they will give it, but that is not the solution to the problem. Destitution, too, should not be used as a pretext. Money is what matters, but even so, money is not the crucial issue. The matter can be solved if sufficient active and popular concern and understanding for the problems of the Catholic press are gained. In response to the peril, circulation should grow and distribution should improve. This must happen within the parishes; this must become the common cause of curates, vicars, and lay persons. Attention should be paid to the Catholic press, and it should be viewed as an effective means of spreading the Gospel, an instrument of pastoral work, and also an aid in the self-organization of lay persons. The movements and groups active within the Catholic Church should view the cause of the Catholic press as their own cause, while that press should assist in their growth.

We shall regain neither political nor economic sovereignty unless the groups, movements, and committees cohere into the civic society, the base of local self-governments.

Are local self-governments and civic committees a subject for the Catholic press? Is not it more urgent to publish articles about the sacral arts, the Church Fathers, Mariological congresses, the Bible, and sacraments? Articles about all these subjects are needed, but articles about the self-governments and committees are even more needed. The Latin word "religio" means a bond, a linkage. Tradition, art, spirituality—all this is supposed to bring men closer together, to link them to each other

by Divine love. Without a genuine bond what are the committees to us even if they have telefaxes and seven telephones each?

The independent press has burgeoned and all sorts of parties are thinking about publishing their own periodicals to present their platforms. Then also there are entrepreneurs who desire to establish popular, sensationalist periodicals for profit-making purposes. On such a crowded market, will there be room for the Catholic press? Not everyone will be hooked by the sensationalist press, and not everyone is interested in the game of politics. There will still be plenty of people interested in reading a daily or a weekly that is published chiefly not for the purpose of gaining voters or making profits. There will also be some demand for periodicals focused on enduring human values, building interpersonal bonds, uniting rather than dividing, and broader time horizons than the quarterly balance sheet or the period between one election and another.

I may be writing all this a bit in advance of what will happen, because the press of the various political parties is still in its nascent stage (except the PZPR press, but that is from another era), while the sensationalist press is still vacillating between Western models and the RSW-Prasa [Workers Publishing Cooperative] model. But let us say it openly that the Catholic press too is looking for a model and, if it wants to expand its readership, it must be better. What kind of press is it to become? That in itself is a subject too broad to be treated in one article and deserves broader discussion, with the participation of readers.

I am aware that the new economic situation, the increases in newsprint prices, threatens the decimation of nearly the entire press being published in Poland, but I am most familiar with the situation of our PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI and particularly concerned about having our periodical sail into the haven of solvency. For 5 years now I have been linked to PRZEGŁAD by much more than just my being an editor and a columnist for it. At present we are experiencing an acute crisis. The price at which readers buy this periodical is actually the price of the newsprint alone. The Warsaw church has to subsidize our expenses on honorariums, editorial outlays, and

printing. Every time the price is raised the situation becomes dramatic because we then lose another couple of percent of our readership—often the persons who are the most faithful readers and need us the most. Since the new year we have had to reduce our circulation by one-third, which is augmenting our deficit still further. We lost 10,000 subscribers, which is a serious loss. Some could no longer afford the subscription, while others could but were discouraged by bureaucratic absurdities, by the long lines at post offices. As for our distributor [RSW-Prasa], which has monopoly [on the distribution of all periodicals in Poland], from the beginning our relations have been far from the best. We have never been certain which percentage of the returns is due to insufficient readership and which to the lack of interest or tardiness on the part of the RSW-Prasa, which after all is for the most part owned by the PZPR. We are therefore persistently trying to reach our readers in other ways as well, for example through the mediation of the churches, with best success in Kielce. We place great hopes in the nascent movement of lay Catholics and reviving parishes. May they view us as their partner and assistant. We desire to be the periodical of communities, the periodical of active and inquiring Catholics, and that is why we believe that, together with them, we shall endure these trying times. We need help in distributing our periodical, and we are thinking of forming a special fund to save it in these critical moments. (Our bank account number is: PKO VIII, Warsaw, No. 1586-41159-136, Wyd. Arch. Warsz.) It is good that by now a law allowing tax-exempt donations has been issued. We also desire to assist the civic movement of Catholics and the initiatives of parish and broader scope. Invite us to your meetings and write us about your ideas and needs. We must not give up, because in 3 years we want to welcome the Polish pope, and he will ask, "What did you do about your Catholic press? After all, I had told you on Parade Square, 'Don't forget that our own Polish Fatherland needs a new spreading of the Gospel, just as does the entire Christian Europe. After centuries and millennia, still a new spreading! The entire Europe has become a continent of great challenge to spreading the Gospel. Poland too. How do you intend to spread the Gospel anew without the periodicals in which the Eternal Truth meets the truth of your times?'"

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

People's Police Chief on Future Tasks

90EG0173A East Berlin JUNG WELT in German
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[Interview with Major General Dieter Winderlich, deputy minister for Internal Affairs and chief of the People's Police, by Sabine Sauer; place and date not given: "In the Service of the People: The Changed Police Force"]

[Text] Maj. Gen. Dieter Winderlich, born in 1938, married, one son, has been deputy minister and chief of the people's Police for the past 18 days—no easy task for this trained teacher and long-term member of the police force.

Sabine Sauer of JUNG WELT questioned him on the role of the People's Police in the past, present, and future.

[JUNG WELT] Have social reforms changed the role of the People's police?

[Winderlich] Our first priority is still to guarantee a high degree of order and security, to prevent crimes, and if they occur, to prosecute them with full force. Furthermore, we are aware of the people's justified hopes and wishes for speedy and nonviolent social reforms.

[JUNG WELT] What does this mean in concrete terms for the People's Police?

[Winderlich] It comes down to a question of allegiance, and our answer is that we no longer owe allegiance to a party or a class, but rather to a body of law. In this sense, we have become a true people's police.

[JUNG WELT] That was not always so in the past, especially when events in October 1989 discredited the People's Police in the eyes of the people....

[Winderlich] True. We were burdened with operation and security directives that gave us the reputation of a force "ready to beat up on anybody" at the slightest provocation. As a result, relations between the public and the police generally remained tainted—with the police on the defensive. Changes in the Ministry for Internal Affairs added to an already unsettled atmosphere. Only now, with a new minister in charge, do we have a clear sense of how to leave this situation behind.

[JUNG WELT] Let's stay with the October events for a while. There have been proven incidents where the police beat up on demonstrators. Serious charges have been leveled against the police, stating that it tried to impede or in some cases completely obstruct investigations by the prosecution.

[Winderlich] For the past two months, at first in an acting capacity only, I have been responsible for the operational forces of the People's Police. Neither the

prosecutor general of the GDR nor the prosecutor general of Berlin has yet approached me yet with specific evidence or inquiries. All I know is what I have read in the papers. I assure you that I will make certain that every lead is followed up immediately because people won't believe that the People's Police has changed unless they are told what really happened in October. Membership in the police force carries an ethical component; only those officers with moral integrity can win the population's trust.

[JUNG WELT] You are facing a difficult situation. On the one hand you are burdened with the reputation of being "prone to use violence"; on the other hand, the events that took place early last week in the Normannenstrasse in Berlin show that the police need to have recourse to some means of riot control.

[Winderlich] We trust in security partnership, because in our opinion this is the only way to ensure peaceful demonstrations, and the past few weeks and months have proven this. However, the demonstration in Berlin has shown that the security partnership between its organizers and the police has to start well ahead of the actual event. It is no longer enough for the organizers of citizen movements to call for demonstrations, to organize and advertise them countrywide, and then as an afterthought to inform the police. We would like to be consulted as soon as the call for a demonstration goes out. That way we can call in our specialists as well as psychologists, educators, and such. This does not mean that they will try to influence the content of the demonstration; rather they will try to predict the effect a particular demonstration will have on the public.

[JUNG WELT] It takes two to make a security partnership....

[Winderlich] Yes, the situation is new to us as well. We were accustomed to demonstrations that were planned and organized down to the last detail at least a year ahead of time...now that has changed. For example, demonstrations at the last Congress of the People's Chamber caused massive disruptions. Part of the problem was that our former leaders never thought of the possibility of spontaneous demonstrations. Unlike in other countries, where parliamentary meeting grounds are set off from the public by a cordon sanitaire one mile wide, our leaders meet in a building situated on a very busy public square.

The People's Chamber has asked us to ensure that the next meeting stays free of incident. We will use various security measures, such as increasing our forces and putting in effect everything necessary to guarantee order and security. Certain streets around the People's Chamber will be closed to public traffic.

[JUNG WELT] It seems to me though, that despite all precautions, one cannot exclude the possibility of violence. How will the police react then?

[Winderlich] We have learned from the past that political problems cannot be solved by the police; if it tries to do so, it will become a national embarrassment. The People's Police will monitor demonstrations with increased force, but it will not try to influence the nature of demonstrations. We will be there to protect citizens and buildings, and it is no big secret that we have the resources to break up any demonstration. However, we will only act if there is a consensus among all political parties and forces. Breaking up a demonstration is a means of last resort—we are fully aware of that—because such an act would only intensify the crisis.

[JUNGE WELT] There has been talk since December last year that new police legislation is in the making. What do you think is most important about it?

[Winderlich] The most important aspect of this legislation will have to be that the police forces, as mentioned before, are now open to everybody and are there to serve the public. We have abolished old cadre-related stipulations. Today, anybody can join the police force as long as he fulfills the necessary requirements, among which I count a high school education, appropriate professional qualifications, and above all loyalty to our country's constitution.

We also need a clear legal definition of the kind of powers and responsibilities the People's Police is endowed with. In short: The police can only do what is expressly allowed by law.

Also the police force needs to be backed up in its actions and needs an enhanced social position.

[JUNGE WELT] Are you talking about civil service status for the police?

[Winderlich] Yes. The state owes its servants social security at all times. This practice is internationally recognized and the UN General Assembly has supported it by resolution. All democratic countries provide for the social security of its police force, so it may serve the public loyally, and independently of whichever party is in power. The new police legislation will establish such a practice in the GDR as well.

[JUNGE WELT] It has finally been decided to do without a state security police until 6 May. This brings additional responsibilities for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the People's Police. Can you handle all that?

[Winderlich] Certain areas such as counterespionage, antiterrorism, and personal police protection are not part of the responsibilities of the People's Police, but rather those of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. To fulfill these responsibilities, it will have to draw on material and financial resources as well as on specialized personnel of the former state security police. Civilians will decide on structural decisions through an independent commission consisting of three representatives of the Roundtable.

However, it is solely up to the People's Police to ward off left and right-wing extremism. To meet this challenge, we have restructured our crime detection force to allow for specialized units. All sections have been informed of the problematic situation and we have established a central intelligence coordinating unit within the ministry; but in the end, our crime detection forces and the People's Police can fight neither hidden nor evident causes, only their effects. Our problem is that we are not called in until trouble is in full swing.

Potential Changes in Security Arrangements Viewed

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[Article by Prof. Dr. Max Schmidt, director of the Institute for Politics and Economics, and Dr. Wolfgang Schwarz: "The GDR's Security Interests and Problems—Open Questions and Points To Ponder"]

[Text] Following the revolution in the development of the GDR, the reformulation of the social consensus among the democratic public on the GDR's future domestic and external policy has become inevitable. This also involves the GDR's security interests and their realization. The following views, submitted for discussion, are concerned with the relevant problems.

Security Interests in the Defense Sphere

The guaranteed and permanent preservation of peace is the primary and overreaching interest of the GDR. This compelling requirement of the GDR's life and development arises from the specificity of its security situation. The following are the decisive features involved:

- In terms of geostrategy the GDR is located at the Central European border between the Warsaw Pact (WVO) and NATO, where the two Blocs have largely concentrated their nuclear-conventional (and, to some extent, chemical) potential for counterattack and destruction.
- For an industrial country with the standard of development of the GDR, any kind of warfare on its territory is no longer survivable, because the present complex economic-technological and social infrastructures are essentially vulnerable to even limited weapons use.
- The defense of the country can no longer be guaranteed by military means alone, and the peace preserving function of our Armed Forces makes sense only as long as their weapons are not used; in other words, it simply represents a deterrent to potential military enemies.

The prevention of war requires first of all stable international relations within Europe. In the case of the GDR this applies to relations with the other Warsaw Pact member countries as well as with the FRG and other

NATO countries, and not least with neutral and non-aligned countries. The preservation of peace also, and to no less an extent, requires stability within the GDR proper, that is, ultimately, an external and internal political situation affording almost no scope to the generation and exacerbation of tensions and crises or any situations that may give rise to the danger of war.

Linked with this is another fundamental security interest of the GDR. A system of mutual deterrence nowadays guarantees military security by means of the GDR's Armed Forces within the Warsaw Pact coalition and in relation to NATO Armed Forces and armaments. However, this system is currently based on a level of military confrontation so excessive that, in case of failure (the outbreak of war), it would bring about the destruction of both sides—certainly that of the GDR. The GDR, therefore, has a vital interest in reducing the military confrontation in Europe. In concrete terms this involves the widest ranging possible mutual disarmament, at least down to a level low enough to eliminate reciprocal possibilities of attack and annihilation.

These two fundamental interests—the preservation of peace by disarmament in East-West relations—can be secured permanently and in terms of practical politics only on the basis of a stable alliance with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member countries within a common European setting that has been qualitatively changed and is no longer characterized primarily by confrontation but by cooperation and competition between the systems.

In the past, the close and unswerving alliance between the GDR, the USSR, and the other Warsaw Pact members represented an indispensable prerequisite and external guarantee for the life and development of the GDR. Considered from the aspects cited above, these relations have now acquired a broader perspective, and in the future the GDR must basically be actively and resolutely interested in working for a close relationship of equal partnership, in particular with regard to its links with the USSR. Indeed, it will be imperative to organize the necessary renewal of the Warsaw Pact itself on such a basis—in the meaning of an adjustment to present-day requirements by the transformation of a largely military into a political alliance. On the other hand, NATO as well as the Warsaw Pact will need increasingly to expand its political nature, and both these alliances will for some time to come provide a stable framework for the changes and the renewal processes in Europe. We think that it will be necessary step by step to set up security and cooperation structures that span the two alliances.

Concerning the future shape of the common Europe, we reiterate our basic concept: International relations must be oriented toward transforming system enmity into a cooperative-coexistential relationship without reciprocal threats, and, at the same time, make cooperation the starting point of the common answer to existing regional and global challenges.¹ The GDR's security situation

certainly postulates objective interest in an active and offensive policy in all spheres of the CSCE process.

Outlines of a Realistic Analysis of the Threat

A realistic and long overdue analysis of NATO's actual military threat to the GDR and the Warsaw Pact represents an essential basis for GDR security and defence policy. Such an analysis must be the result of the comprehensive rather than selective consideration of facts and interrelations. The fundamental methodological problem exists in the fact that it is imperative to get rid of the former equation of NATO military preparations for defense purposes with aggressive military intentions or the political readiness to deliberately incite war. This equation is all wrong and actually counterproductive when serving as the basis of our own politico-military decisions, because:

- It is derived from the schematic transfer to the present and future of socialist historical experiences of imperialist aggressiveness and fails to take into account some fundamental changes in the economic base of the capitalist system, specially in Western Europe. These changes definitely operate against a renewal in their political leadership's interest in a war on our continent.
- It artificially narrows our view of military events in NATO and virtually blinds us to the fact that the primacy of politics over militarism is not just an element of bourgeois democracies but also secured quite effectively by the internal composition of the leading NATO countries.
- No social preparations for war now exist in the NATO countries, neither in terms of politics, defense economics, nor mass psychology. Nor are there any indications that they are to be generated.
- NATO's internal structure virtually excludes any arbitrary programming for a war of aggression against the Warsaw Pact by individual members of the pact (the United States, for example).
- In the past it repeatedly helped to stimulate Warsaw Pact rearmament efforts which, in turn, heated up the arms race—for instance, the fairly recent Warsaw Pact efforts toward military superiority and the ability to be victorious in every type of warfare.
- Finally—and this is politically decisive—it ignores the objective basic interest of the highly industrialized and socially organized NATO countries in preventing a war between East and West and, therefore, a fundamentally similar interest in achieving security by potentially wide-reaching disarmament policies, accompanied by other implications on both sides. When we analyze the FRG's military security situation (largely corresponding to that of the GDR), we may believe its senior politicians, when they say "the prevention of a nonatomic war, too, is a vital German interest."²

In consideration of all this, it is quite wrong at the present time once and for all and without any differentiation to interpret military and defense developments in NATO as confirming that "they have not given up striving for superiority, that is the creation of the proper prerequisites for *aggressive war* (italized by the authors) or the exercise of military pressure, and their planning for war is still valid."³ The consequent description of a NATO threat preserves an unrealistic hostile image which damages our own credibility at home and abroad as well as the observance of our own security interests. It obstructs, for example, the practical political application of the perception that in many areas East and West have necessarily become partners in safeguarding their respective survival and development—that refers to the prevention of war and disarmament just as much as to environmental control, the safety aspects of scientific-technological advances, and so on. If such exaggerated threats are claimed to persist, the reorientation of Warsaw Pact military doctrine, strategy, and Armed Forces to strictly defensive considerations and the sharp unilateral disarmament steps of its member countries are not only inexplicable, they are bound to look like the negligent sell-off of national security!

The present potential NATO military threat to the GDR and the Warsaw Pact is not offered by the possibility that the North Atlantic Pact might plan and prepare for deliberate aggressive war with broad strategic targets. It is rather that, in the case of war, NATO has at its disposal and is even expanding a military strategy geared to premeditated escalation, including a possible nuclear first strike, as well as operational and strategic nuclear-conventional offensive options. If these military options were to be exercised, the GDR and other Warsaw Pact countries would be irreversibly destroyed. Our own security and defense reflections must start from this threat, while we need to fully realize that we cannot get rid of it by our own military efforts and more arms but only by disarmament (accompanied by the appropriate Warsaw Pact offensive options). This brings us to another central issue.

For a GDR Disarmament Concept

A determined politico-military concept for continuing disarmament in Europe and the definition of our own attitudes, activities, initiatives, and contributions in this process needs to be drafted in the GDR, based on the specific security interests of our country. The People's Chamber might appoint a committee of inquiry, composed of civilian and military experts from politics, science, diplomacy, and the Armed Forces. Their proposals should be discussed in the People's Chamber Plenum, enacted and handed over to the government for implementation and reporting.

The European disarmament process should target the abolition of the reciprocal attack and annihilation capabilities in both alliance systems. This could be done by achieving a situation of reciprocal structural incapacity for attack, abolishing the military means for actions

(attacks and counterattacks) at the strategic and operational level of warfare. Such an intent might become the starting or orientation point of our own disarmament concepts, for measures that are confidence and security enhancing, for verification and related questions.

At this point we would like to interject another notion: On the one hand it is almost impossible in terms of its political significance for a fundamental change in East-West relations to overestimate the value of the Warsaw Pact's current strictly defensive posture with regard to military doctrine and strategy, in other words its orientation toward primarily defensive actions in the case of war. On the other hand this orientation continues to present serious security problems for the GDR, because warlike operations would no longer be promptly and massively advanced to the territory of the aggressors. On the contrary, defense would operate in Central Europe, mainly on the territory of the GDR (and the CSSR),⁴ and result in the total destruction of our country. Some senior Soviet officers, for example, are thinking in terms of a 20-30 day defense in the early stages of a war. We need to make it quite clear that this would be totally out of the question for the GDR. In the case of war, the GDR would probable cease to exist after only two or three days. An entirely defensive orientation as a military doctrine and prime strategic principle cannot, therefore, be the sole aim of the GDR. We must consider and organize it as no more than an interim stage in the abolition of the military confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact by joint disarmament, until reciprocal structural incapacity for aggression is achieved.⁵

Other than for the USSR, for example, the involvement of the operational level of warfare represents a central problem for the GDR. As long as the NATO forces in Central Europe have operational offensive options, they are able to carry on military actions of a strategic nature as far as the GDR is concerned, because they might well involve our entire territory. We need to consider this possibility very seriously because a future situation might well require the GDR's Armed Forces to keep off potential enemies without the massive presence of Soviet troops in our country. In terms of practicable defense, the security problems arising thereby can be dealt with only by the incapacity of either side to attack inside Central Europe. This would ultimately happen when the still existing, severely reduced and defensively restructured Armed Forces can be used only on the respective home territory for the defense of the border instead of being able to launch surprise attacks or massively across the border.

Within the Warsaw Pact and with a view to the Vienna negotiations with NATO as well as at these negotiations proper, the GDR must consequently urge the precise definition of the ultimate goal of the negotiations on the basis of the agreed mandate. The mandate offers the necessary scope: After all, "the priority concern" in Vienna is "the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attacks and the initiation of major offensive operations."⁶ This requires us to analyze,

clearly address, and plausibly describe the options (as the product of material military capabilities and structures as well as operational or strategic deployment conceptions) to be abandoned by the other side if the Vienna mandate is to fully utilized. If, therefore, reciprocal incapacity to attack is to become a reality, NATO would first of all have to abandon those options involved in the conceptual terms "offensive counterair, air interdiction and FOFA [Follow On Forces Attack]," as well as NATO's massive growth and mobilization capabilities, in particular on FRG territory.

Problems With Respect to the Abolition of the System of Deterrence

Within the framework of the fundamental change in the East-West relationship desired by all the Warsaw Pact countries with a view to a largely cooperative relationship, one of the strategic politico-military goals is the abolition of the currently existing system of mutual military deterrence. At the center of this system is the confrontation of two opposing military blocs and the mutual paralyzation of their potential for warfare. As presently constituted, this system of deterrence is the result of many years of the arms race. Both sides participated in this race because, despite different interests and motivations, the two alliance systems long assigned to the military factor the decisive role in the conflict between the systems. Consequently, they now have available military forces and resources that represent the potential for virtual self-annihilation.

However, the following facts of the matter represent a paradox of international relations: The system of deterrence can be abolished only in cooperation, in coordinated joint advances with those leading political circles in the NATO countries, the majority of whom prefer to cling to the philosophy, doctrine and policy of deterrence. This has two consequences:

First: We need to clearly define our own priorities to the effect that our primary goal is the abolition of the system of deterrence, not of the West's notion of deterrence and the rhetoric related thereto. At the same time we should not by any means consider unimportant the connections between these two considerations. For the Warsaw Pact's aims, for example, the type of deterrence notion—offensive/warlike or defensive/defense oriented—prevailing in NATO is of crucial importance.

Second: In all our necessary sober and critical objections to deterrence, we must avoid any blanket condemnation, let alone demonization, of Western leadership circles who wish to retain it. This would be counterproductive from the aspect of the search for necessary, though initially maybe partial, cooperation partners in NATO.

NATO political as well as military leaders have hitherto vehemently rejected the abandonment of the policy of deterrence, because they interpret the 45 years of peace in Europe as being due to it. More concrete steps (such as the INF Treaty) are therefore needed (and possible) to

minimize the risks and reduce military confrontation in the existing system of deterrence.

This requires us to soberly ponder the problem of a minimum nuclear deterrent or, to put it better, a minimum nuclear obstacle. The GDR is entitled and has good reason to state its view, because for probably the foreseeable future it will still act as a host country for at least nuclear delivery systems.

It is our opinion that a minimum nuclear obstacle, restricted to strategic weapons and at a very low level (actual ideas on this issue are to be found in the USSR as well as in the United States),⁷ might well be a meaningful interim goal on the way to a nuclear free world, in particular if linked with a comprehensive disarmament process to result in the incapacity for reciprocal attacks in Europe. This could initially ease the approach to a very broad reduction in the nuclear weapon stock of all nuclear powers.

At the same time we need to realize that there is an increasing number of so-called threshold countries that, depending on the decisions made, might also more or less quickly produce nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament would be totally meaningless if the abandonment of military nuclear power status by the present nuclear powers were to provide an opportunity to other countries by an even numerically small nuclear weapons potential to obtain strategic powers and use them for political or even military ends. A nuclear free world can be obtained only by way of a global solution, considered safe by all countries. In this context, a minimum nuclear obstacle may, in our opinion, exercise a necessary and stabilizing function for a transitional period.

Experts in the respective countries and beyond should therefore discuss these and other questions. Incidentally, M. Gorbachev suggested just this in Strasbourg. The GDR will have to participate in such talks.

Open Disarmament Issues

In addition to the groups of problems addressed so far, there are many other disarmament issues that, up to now, have not been sufficiently analyzed, let alone resolved. In the interest of the GDR's comprehensive national and international involvement, it appears appropriate for science and politics to more intensively ponder the following questions:

The Qualitative and Technological Arms Race

Despite the successes achieved by the efforts to restrict rearmament and promote disarmament in and between East and West as well as the probable results of the current negotiations, we must not forget that the qualitative dynamic of the arms race not only continues unchecked but in fact is growing. The highest priority needs to be assigned to making these processes an integral element of the ongoing disarmament process in order to stop them or, at least, by the beginnings of

cooperative arms control⁸ steer them toward coordinated pathways. If this does not happen, the earlier disarmament concepts and agreements, largely oriented toward quantities, as well as any future negotiated results may soon turn out to be hollow and meaningless. This could happen if at the Vienna negotiations on the 23d, for example, the bilateral reduction of destructive and aggressive capabilities is achieved by the numerical reduction of major conventional weapons and then compensated, if not overcompensated, by qualitative innovations with respect to the remaining systems. So far, with few exceptions,⁹ these problems have not been seriously discussed by either political science or military experts in the GDR, the USSR, or other Warsaw Pact countries.

A concrete question: Why has the socialist side so far failed to raise this topic at the Vienna negotiations with NATO? Some diplomatic representatives at these negotiations claim the reason to be the wish not to unduly complicate the negotiations nor obstruct the rapid conclusion of an initial agreement. That is quite true, but, at the same time, we must acknowledge that the parity aimed for in Vienna on the basis of equal upper limits to major conventional weapons definitely and in a manner that, in our opinion, raises security problems, favors the side that is more advanced in terms of weapons technology. And that is most certainly NATO.

Some people in the Warsaw Pact may have trouble admitting the existence of a definite and relatively wide technological gap in favor of NATO, but Western experts¹⁰ are aware of that anyway and have so concluded repeatedly in various instances of clashes between Eastern and Western military equipment (as in the Middle East wars, for example). In the present situation, this problem cannot be solved by speeding up our own technological weapons development. That would be a misstep of strategic proportions and contradict the GDR's vital interests, because it would preprogram the continued pursuit, indeed the intensification, of the arms race. People in the GDR and the Warsaw Pact should instead ponder a proposal to be submitted in Vienna for a bilateral halt to arms modernization in the weapons categories involved in the negotiations, in order thereby to stop qualitative development in the decisive sectors of the conventional weapons technology oriented to offensive capability. Though this would imply the virtual permanence of the Warsaw Pact's present technological arrears, it ought to be acceptable in the interest of a wider security gain and should be offered the Western side as an incentive for a corresponding agreement.

Arms Conversion

The GDR's unilateral disarmament measures as well as foreseeable further international agreements on the reduction of military arsenals in Europe (something in which the GDR is actively involved) open up the possibility of using for the settlement of economic and social problems the budgetary resources formerly used for military purposes as well as manpower and capacities

now tied up by the Armed Forces, including those employed in research, development, production, and services. However, in order to actually have this type of conversion turn into a source of accumulation for the national economy and realized properly and meaningfully in social, economic, and ecological terms, intensive scientific preparatory work will be needed. A meeting of the Scientific Council for Peace Research at the GDR Academy of Sciences, held on 7 November 1989, may have served as a curtain raiser.

Scientists, engineers, economists and military experts and also members of the public should discuss how to settle the problem of conversion at the least cost and with the greatest benefit. This also applies to ways and means for scrapping major weapons systems, something that must be done without new burdens being placed on the national economy. If, for example, it should be necessary in the GDR to use welding techniques to break up tank parts made of special alloys, and these processes were to largely tie up the substances available for such techniques to the national economy as a whole, we will necessarily have to search for more efficient disarmament methods.

The drafting of a national plan of conversion and the democratic discussion of it, including alternative proposals for solving the problem, might facilitate a productive dialogue for coping with the demands of conversion and, at the same time, impressively demonstrate the range and consistency of the GDR's disarmament policy. Here also, the People's Chamber might well appoint a committee of experts.

Verification

The verification of disarmament steps as well as of measures designed to build confidence and security represents a crucial prerequisite for any far reaching disarmament process and, at the same time, is a factor in building up political trust. Guaranteed verification is justifiably assumed to be required for the achievement of international disarmament agreements. As yet too little attention has been devoted in the GDR to this problem. We are still waiting for a serious and scientific study of the political, military, technological, and, not least, financial problems involved. We are still lacking an answer, from the GDR standpoint, to the question of the extent of supervision needed and sufficient for which sectors of disarmament.

Let us just take a look at the Vienna negotiations with NATO. The GDR is a country interested in the assurance of the necessary range, depth, and continuity of supervisory measures as well as resource efficiency. With regard to the verification of future steps toward disarmament, the GDR ought therefore to work for collective supervisory mechanisms and, in the interest of the most extensive target of the negotiations also for mechanisms transcending the Blocs. We ought to develop our own concepts and submit them to the Warsaw Pact and

Vienna—possibly an outline conception for a European verification agency as part of the increasingly evolving institutionalized CSCE structures. This task ought to be tackled in the near future, considering that a first negotiation result may be achieved in Vienna in 1990.

Particularly urgent in this connection is the need for realistic proposals on the verification of Air Force stocks, reductions, and operations. Being very mobile and quickly activated, these forces present special problems.

In the case of extensive reductions or departures from Europe, it will be necessary to deal with the infrastructure of the Air Force, especially the abandonment of military airfields and hardened hangars (shelters). This will make more difficult the rapid reintroduction of foreign aircraft in the space of reduction. Supervision of that space will require a virtual complex of measures. It would probably be best achieved by the exchange of permanent observers in the military air surveillance and control centers of the Air Force of the opposite side—a notion that tends to be rejected on principle by the military who point out the need for secrecy. A sober factual debate between civilian and military experts on the pros and cons of such a type of verification would certainly be helpful. Ultimately, it will be up to the politicians to set clear political priorities.

Another aspect: We all know that the USSR and the United States have lately achieved a definite rapprochement with respect to the relatively old idea of a sky open to surveillance flights. It would serve the GDR's disarmament and detente efforts to develop and resolutely champion its own positive stance with regard to that matter. After all, the GDR has long been an open book for reconnaissance by the other side, given:

- The operation of Western military missions.
- The intensity of radio electronic surveillance from FRG territory and West Berlin.
- The existing allied air corridors between the FRG and West Berlin.
- The intensive West-East travel and transit traffic on GDR territory.

By comparison with other European countries, the GDR potential for military secrecy is therefore very limited indeed. To make this state of affairs productive with respect to disarmament policy and, not least, to open up for the GDR more necessary control opportunities vis-à-vis NATO, we are recommending that the GDR should adopt and strenuously advocate the concept of an open sky for Europe on a reciprocal basis. Such a broad opening up to verification and surveillance would also offer another clear political signal underlining the credibility and seriousness of GDR disarmament efforts. We might persuasively complement this by the parallel reduction to an indispensable minimum of military exclusion areas in the GDR.

A scientific exchange of opinion, a process of discussion and clarification relating to these and many other defense political security questions is urgently needed if the GDR is to be as efficiently as possible prepared to represent and safeguard its specific security interests within Warsaw Pact and, together with its other member countries, in the East-West dialogue as now proceeding in a changed international situation and a new stage of all-European developments. Such a process of discussion, clarification, and opinion forming must now, far more than in the past, help prepare the appropriate GDR decisions and actions with respect to foreign and defense policy and critically and analytically accompany their realization. To do so, it will be necessary to make fully available to political science the indispensable basic and special data from the security sector—something that has not been the case in the past. This applies especially to data such as the NATO countries routinely publish about themselves, and that are part of the normal basis of political science studies there. Our country's scientific potential needs an empirically secure base in order to become a full partner in the political process.

Footnotes

1. For details see: M. Schmidt/W. Schwarz, "The Common Home Europe—Realities, Challenges, Prospects" (I and II), IPW-BERICHT, Nos. 9 and 10, pp. 1ff respectively.
2. As per A. Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] Bundestage faction, to the American public; cited in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, East Berlin, 6 May 1988.
3. W. Weber, "Kriegsplaene der NATO fuer Zentraleuropa. Ansichten und Moeglichkeiten der NATO zur Androhung und Anwendung Militaerischer Gewalt in Zentraleuropa und im Ostseeraum. Realitaeten und Fakten" [NATO War Plans for Central Europe. NATO Views and Potentials for the Threat and Use of Military Force in Central Europe and the Baltic Region. Realities and Fact], Berlin 1989, pp. 9f.
4. See, for example, M. Moissseyev, "Adequate Defense," MILITAERWESEN, No. 7/1989, Berlin, p. 18.
5. Other GDR experts also advocate this interpretation; see A. Brie, "Conventional Disarmament in Europe and GDR Security Interests (Theses)," FORSCHUNG FUER DEN FRIEDEN (issued by the Scientific Council for Peace Research at the GDR Academy of Sciences), Berlin, No. III/1989, p. 15.
6. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 21/22 January 1989.
7. See, for example: Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, "Against the Nuclear Threat, Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions," report on a study, Moscow 1987, in particular p. 32; R.S. McNamara, "Blindlings ins Verderben. Der

Bankrott der Atomstrategie" [Blindly into Doom. The Bankruptcy of the Nuclear Strategy], Reinbek nr. Hamburg 1987, p. 119.

8. See, for example: W. Count von Baudissin/D.S. Lutz, "Cooperative Arms Control in Europe, DGFK-Jahrbuch [not further identified] Annual 1979/1980, "On Detente in Europe," Baden-Baden 1980, pp. 445ff.

9. See, for example: H.-J. Giessmann, "Challenges and Possibilities for Arms Restriction and Disarmament," FORSCHUNG FUER FRIEDEN, No. II/1989, pp. 1ff.

10. See, among others: A. Cockburn, "Die Sowjetische Herausforderung. Macht und Ohnmacht des Militaerischen Giganten" [The Soviet Challenge. Power and Powerlessness of the Military Giant], Berne-Munich-Vienna 1983.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Discussion of Warsaw Pact Arms Sales: Ideological Role Minimal

90EP0337A Warsaw POLITYKA-EKSPORT-IMPORT
in Polish No 26, 23-30 Dec 89 p 26

[Article by Andrzej Karkoszka: "The Socialist Arms Trade"]

[Text] Arms trade has been either badmouthed or not at all mentioned in this country. The phrase "merchant of death" was an epithet reserved for NATO countries. Officially nothing was said about arms trading by the socialist countries. It was only the rise of the international institutions collecting and publishing figures on that trade, as well as, chiefly, the Soviet-American talks on arms sales controls, initiated in 1977, that revealed certain secrets of the world "bazaar of death," with respect to the socialist countries as well.

Broad public opinion in our countries has had, however, to wait until now for a partial removal of the veil over activities regarded worldwide as normal even though morally ambiguous. And even now the approach to this issue is two-faced: yes, we sell arms, but we do not publish statistics, not even the most general ones. Were the so-called man in the street to want some idea of the extent and importance of our arms trade in the country's balance of payments, its role in the economy and in the growth of our technology, etc., he would have to base himself on not readily available Western publications. Hence, let us discuss facts and figures, and a little history as well.

A Political Commodity

From the outset of the cold war between East and West, arms became a highly political commodity. At first, the intensive arming of allies in Europe and subsequently of other countries throughout the world was an element of the struggle for political influence. This was what the Americans did in South Korea and Taiwan, and this was what the Russians began to do in Egypt and Indonesia. What mattered at the time was not so much profits as political and diplomatic gains. Arms were transmitted as part of military assistance, gratis or on longterm credit terms. To the socialist countries the question of military assistance for the national-liberation movements in the former colonies was ideologically and politically unequivocal. They sent them arms under the lofty slogan of aid for the struggle for self-determination and freedom; at the same time, this concerned a great strategic game for eliminating the influence of the capitalist West from these former colonies.

Without the considerable assistance in arms and equipment Vietnam could not have won, first, the war against France and, later, against the United States. Egypt, Syria, Cuba, and Ethiopia would not have built their military might; the struggle of the liberation forces in Angola would not have been possible. However, basing arms

transfers on donations and cheap, longterm credit sometimes resulted in considerable disappointment and losses. When in 1972 Egypt changed its political orientations and demanded the removal of 17,000 Soviet advisers, its debt to the Soviet Union for military assistance provided during 1961-71, exceeded US\$4 billion. To this day the repayment of this debt has been stalled. Similarly disappointing was the political turnabout in Somalia and Indonesia, major recipients of arms, equipment, and other Soviet military assistance reckoned in billions of dollars, which were irretrievably forfeited. The consequences of military assistance for Mali, Morocco, or Algeria, were similar, though on a much smaller scale. It is not surprising either that, gradually, the socialist countries, emulating the Western countries, began to treat arms trade and military assistance as measures that may be politically motivated but are based on firm commercial principles. Increasingly often, contracts for arms sales have been based on the criteria of cost-effectiveness or at least on barter trade, that is, on the exchange of arms for goods offered by the customer (e.g., Libyan crude). It is only when the matter concerns winning a completely new market that agreements offering highly favorable credit terms to the customer are concluded; this concerns, e.g., in recent years, the Soviet offer to sell MiG-29's to Jordan or antiaircraft missiles to Kuwait.

Although the value of the trade in arms and military equipment ascribed to the Soviet Union and other countries of our camp is huge, it is difficult to assess the financial scope of these operations. The wording and the payment terms of the agreements are unknown. The statistics on such transactions published in various Western publications display striking variations. Thus all such published Western figures have to be considered cautiously and regarded more as indicators than as objective quantities. On the other hand, a consideration of the material aspect of the arms trade, indicating the extent of the transfer of discrete kinds of arms and equipment to individual countries and regions of the world, would be more authoritative.

The Potentates

Indisputably the two superpowers account for the greatest share of the world arms trade. As a Dutch scholar put it, in the last three decades the two nuclear powers militarized the entire world with their arms shipments. For the years 1977-84 their arms shipments to Third World countries were estimated by the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at nearly US\$78 billion in Soviet exports and nearly US\$66 billion on the American side. For while in 1975, according to SIPRI data, the Soviet Union still ranked second in arms exports to these countries (US\$2.6 billion compared with US\$4.85 billion in American shipments), as early as in the mid-1980's it advanced to the first place. In the years 1984-88 Soviet arms exports to these countries are estimated to have totaled nearly US\$64 billion compared with US\$50.3 billion in American shipments. Here it is worth noting that even so the volume of the

Soviet arms trade is smaller than that of the overall NATO exports in which, in addition to the United States, other substantial exporters are France, Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy. In 1987 the Soviet Union accounted for nearly 90 percent of the arms exports of Warsaw Pact countries, whereas the share of the United States in NATO arms exports was 64 percent.

These dry financial data acquire a completely different meaning if we consider the quantities of equipment sold. During 1967-76, according to American data, the Soviet Union supplied nearly 23,500 tanks and 1,282 supersonic aircraft to Third World countries. During 5 years, between 1983 and 1987, the USSR supplied the same countries with 3,615 tanks, 7,775 armored transporters, 1,255 supersonic aircraft, and 910 helicopters. Shipments by the other Warsaw Pact countries were reckoned at 840 tanks, 1,355 transporters, and 100 helicopters. In recent years the issue of the sale of shortrange ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has acquired a special importance; they were used in the Iraq-Iran war. When armed with, e.g., warheads containing a toxic gas, they could become a powerful weapon of mass annihilation, a kind of "poor man's nuclear arms." For the last several years NATO countries have discontinued exports of these missiles and of their manufacturing technologies. That decision was made all the easier by the fact that the politically most important clients of the West, e.g., Israel, are capable of manufacturing these weapons on their own and hence that prohibition is of little significance to them. According to Western reports, the Soviet Union is leaning toward reaching an understanding on such a prohibition. So far, however, it has shipped a substantial number of ballistic missiles to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South and North Yemen. There is reason to believe that North Korea has supplied Iran with such missiles.

A major recipient of Soviet arms, as well as of arms from other Warsaw Pact countries (e.g., Polish Iskra flight trainers and tanks) is India. The scope of military cooperation in this case has been broadened by the production of MiG-21's and other armaments under license. Another exception in the history of the arms trade is India's contract for leasing a Soviet nuclear submarine (in addition, India has purchased 11 other Soviet submarines).

Judging from the available data, arms trade is a major source of income to Warsaw Pact countries. For while NATO countries earned a surplus of more than US\$3.7 billion in arms exports over arms imports, for Warsaw Pact countries that surplus amounted to nearly US\$21.5 billion, accounting for nearly 11 percent of their overall exports. As for their arms imports, these do not exceed 2 percent of their overall imports. This substantial surplus is chiefly attributable to the Soviet Union: arms imports to the USSR are estimated at 0.7 percent of its overall imports, whereas arms exports account for nearly one-fifth of its overall exports. These proportions were retained throughout the entire past decade. Assuming that these sales were at least partially in hard currencies,

this means that arms exports are a highly important source of foreign exchange for the Soviet state (just as for France, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, and other industrialized countries). The other socialist countries are explicitly trying to balance their arms imports and exports. (Solely Cuba, outside the countries directly engaged in armed conflict, has a disproportionately large share of arms imports—about one-fourth—in its overall imports, except that they probably are based on credit.)

"The Second Echelon"

In Poland's case in 1987, according to the same sources, arms trade accounted for about 6-7 percent of overall exports and imports. Only in the years 1978-80 and in 1984 there was a considerable surplus of arms exports over imports (verging at US\$400-600 million). Along with Poland, only Czechoslovakia, a prominent arms exporter over many decades, occupies a significant position in the world arms trade. On the world market Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are termed "the second echelon" of suppliers, along with such countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (taking into consideration the volume of sales rather than the kind or quality of the goods supplied).

Compared with the Western countries, the Soviet Union and other countries of our camp are supplying weapons to a relatively small group of customers, to which belong slightly more than 30 countries. Poland, e.g., in the years 1983-87 engaged in arms trade with 17 countries, including its closest allies. This was of a certainty due to political constraints, since in terms of quality the arms offered by the countries of Warsaw Pact are certainly highly attractive. This is so notwithstanding the experience of regional conflicts, often cited by competitors, in which Soviet, Polish, or Czech arms were used by the losing sides. The reason is that the defeats suffered by Egypt, Syria, and Libya are attributed to tactics, command, and general troop training rather than to weakness of armaments, as excellently demonstrated by other armed confrontations—in Vietnam, Iraq, India, and Afghanistan. In arms trade so far the socialist countries have not been handicapped by the assessment that their weapons are relatively simpler technologically. The lag in various technical aspects has been more than offset by the lower price and ease of servicing of these weapons.

On the arms markets the socialist countries compete with each other, like all other suppliers. It also happens that they arm the opposing sides in a conflict. During the Iraq-Iran war the Soviet Union supplied about 47 percent of Iraq's armaments and equipment, while more than 50 percent of Iran's armaments were of Chinese origin. More such examples could be cited.

Commercial ties in the military domain between the two military blocs in Europe are very slender. During the last decade minor contracts were signed by Romania and Bulgaria for shipments of a military nature from Great

Britain and the FRG, and by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for shipments to Greece.

The prospects of the socialist countries for arms trade will of a certainly be greatly influenced by the political changes in recent years as well as by the internationalization of arms production. The share of the two superpowers in the world arms trade is gradually declining in favor of the West European countries, which supply arms of a like quality on convenient financial terms, and above all without the political odium linked to Soviet or American shipments. Similarly, the number of non-European countries developing their own arms production, which is moreover, simpler, cheaper, and often better adapted to local technical and climatic conditions, is growing. The growing cooperation between countries of the East and the West in extinguishing the foci of regional conflicts, and partially also by means of threats to suspend the shipments of weapons and equipment needed to continue belligerent actions, has already resulted in a reduction of the global demand for armaments, ammunition, equipment, and training. Thus there is arising a definite buyer's market for arms, for which the sellers must compete. The best weapon in this competition is a strong financial position enabling sales of arms on convenient credit terms. Of smaller though essential importance is the modernity of the arms or the ability to adapt to the customer's requirements. These trends signify a marked deterioration of the position of such suppliers as Poland that cannot afford to grant credit, invest in the armaments industry and its expansion, and sponsor advertising and marketing of their products.

Nowadays arms sales are ceasing to be based on a combination of ideology and politics and are becoming simply a highly profitable and at the same time increasingly demanding business. Judging from dozens of periodicals printed on quality paper and in highly attractive colors, these days weapons are being sold in the same way as perfumes.

The issue of the moral aspect of this trade is of no major importance. So long as the customers and money are there, suppliers can always be found.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Agriculture Plagued by Inefficient Division of Labor

90EG0182A Bonn DIE WELT in German 5 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Joachim Neander: "8,000 Hectares, 6,000 Cows, 1,100 People, but There Are No Farmers Left Over There—After Eight Hours, the Hay Wagon Is Left Standing on the Field—Experiences of a Westerner"]

[Text] In the country, the changeover from the unproductive planned economy to an efficient, competitive rural agriculture will be more difficult for the GDR than in industry and crafts. "Actually, there are hardly any

real farmers left over there," reported Richard Bayha, CDU [Christian Democratic Union] member of the Bundestag and himself a farmer, following a two-week study trip through the GDR.

Very proudly, the director of an agricultural production cooperative [LPG] with 8,000 hectares of land and 6,000 milk cows had shown Bayha his farm over there: "With this thing I really should be able to compete in the European Community [EC]." Bayha had to dampen his pride: "I have a farm myself over in Hessen, a minifarm by your standards, with approximately 215 hectares of land and 160 head of cattle. The way I figure it, my farm would fit into yours about 40 times over. To compare the costs would be difficult. But let us take the employees for starters, how many do you have?"

The LPG director, a robust, energetic, relatively young man, hesitates somewhat: "I have 1,100, but I must admit that I could manage without approximately half of them if it were not for directives from the party." Bayha: "I'm sorry, but in that case, with the 550 that you would have left, you would still have 350 too many. I have five. And times 40 that would be 200. And I believe that my farm has developed in recent years exactly as the competitive situation in the EC requires."

The question as to whether farmers in the West work themselves to the bone, while life in the East is more leisurely, is not as easy to answer as it seems. Sure, over there there is the guaranteed eight-hour work day. "But," Bayha thinks, "over there the hay wagon is left standing on the field when the clock strikes." And when the tractor is broken, the tractor driver lies in the grass until the repair brigade is called to the scene. And herbicides (including some that have long since been taken out of circulation in the West) are not applied when it would make sense and be necessary, but in some cases only when the agrochemical center has the equipment and chemicals available, and when all that the application does is to cause harm.

In a single LPG barn with 2,000 milk cows (a good average, there is one barn in the GDR with 4,000), four young girls work directly on the so-called milking carousel. For seven hours a day. Bayha: "I understand that they do this for three or four years and then they quit. That is a stress that can drive you crazy. On my farm, the people would strike immediately if the pure milking time for an individual were to be longer than one and one-half hours." In training, too, the concept of all-round farmer was abolished over there years ago. There are almost exclusively specialists left. In the technical sense, even the LPG director relies on his people completely. Incidentally, he earns only about M 2,000 per month, his employees average a little over M 1,000. Bayha: "I racked my brain trying to figure out what it was that would tempt a person to direct an operation with a yearly turnover of M 50 or 60 million for so little money, relatively speaking. Then I found out over there: it appears to be the power that the position confers."

To be sure, this power had to be shared for years with the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]. Bayha: "The party even tried to dictate production methods to them. A state-farm director told me that the party had once demanded of him that he plant potatoes in a crisscross pattern, one row running this way and one that way, so that the work could be done more efficiently. Even though everybody knew that this was nonsense, they did it for two years, until the party realized that the potatoes were left lying around on the field everywhere."

It was the party, too, which separated plant and animal production. But if this were to be rescinded now, the gigantomania would become even greater. Bayha: "In the cultivation of grain and root crops, a breakup and decentralization would be simpler, relatively speaking. But, in animal farming, how are you going to break up such enormous units without gigantic new investments?"

But aren't there still "real" farmers from former days, from the time before compulsory expropriation and collectivization? Bayha: "About 5 percent continued working like real farmers under the aegis of the church, on land belonging to the church." The so-called self-farming area of a half hectare for the LPG farmers is not a foundation for a new start. And many are also totally discouraged. Bayha tells about one person who in the late 1940's had dared to resist the expropriation of his 60-hectare farm. As punishment, he had to spend the rest of his working life, 30 years, hauling liquid manure from morning until night as a laborer on his own land. Information, a return to smaller, more efficient enterprises, an orientation of production to the wishes of the consumers, a strengthening of property and personal responsibility, the creation of independent livelihoods—these are some of the steps which Bayha proposes for a reform of agriculture in the GDR. Richard Bayha also sees chances here for young, venturesome farmers from the FRG. And, as many will be surprised to hear, also for farmers from other EC countries. The Netherlands agricultural attache in Bonn has already indicated an intense interest.

Health Insurance System, Medical Services Reorganizing

Government Wants Insurance Reforms

90EG0188A Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German
12 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by pt: "Fundamental Reform of the Health System Considered Necessary in East Berlin—Health Insurances Want To Help in Organizing a Health Insurance System"]

[Text] Sat/Sun, 10/11 Feb—Also the statutory health insurances and several private health insurance plans have caught "GDR fever." Exploratory talks with representatives of the state health system and the political parties have either already taken place or are due to take place in the coming weeks.

Following the announcement by the East Berlin Ministry for Health of a fundamental reorientation of the GDR health system, which is also to include a "partial" privatization of the services-furnishing sector and the establishment of health insurance plans, these contacts take on significance.

Like the Federal Association of Compulsory Health Insurance Plans, which incidental to a conference of its policy committee in Berlin already established first contacts, the other health insurance plans are placing their bets on information and an exchange of opinions. The thinking in the Federal Association of Compulsory Health Insurance Plans includes such things, for example, as seminars in East Berlin and opening up the administrative schools to trainees and the individual health insurance plans to interns.

Company health insurance plans see a point of departure for an exchange of views in the GDR companies with their very extensive medical services. But there is skepticism here, as well, whether it will be possible, in the near future, to help in the establishment of company-owned health insurance plans. Here the first conversational partners would surely be the companies in which West German enterprises such as Volkswagen AG have already been involved or plan to get involved in the future, according to Gerda Strack, spokeswoman for the Federal Association of Compulsory Health Insurance Plans. The managing committee of this association plans to discuss the subject of cooperation with the GDR in Berlin on 19 February. Their conversational partners are to be the representatives of the parties, especially the newly founded parties, responsible for social policy. But contacts are also being sought with those persons who have had the responsibility in the past.

On 26 and 27 March, the Association of Health Insurance Plans for Salaried Employees plans to hold a seminar in Berlin on the subject of "the health care system in the GDR in the crossfire of political change," at which, among others, Prof. Christoph Brueckner, chairman of the health committee of the GDR People's Chamber, representatives of the new parties, but also prominent political figures from the FRG, are to appear. A delegation of the commercial health insurance plan that was founded in Halle has already taken up initial contacts during a circuit of the GDR.

Difficult Reshaping of Central Structures

Information and an exchange of views must indeed work miracles, for the GDR health system is radically different from the structured and self-administered health insurance system of the FRG. It can probably be best compared to the state health care system of Great Britain. Created after the war on orders of the Soviet occupation force, the GDR health system has in the past oriented itself very strongly to the Soviet "model." While the FDGB [Free German Federation of Trade Unions], as the social insurance "carrier," is responsible for the payment of sick pay and pensions, all health

services are carried out at the direction of the state (Ministry for Health). The SED (recently renamed PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism]) was responsible for the health policy. The financing, since the premiums collected by the FDGB and the state insurance of the GDR did not suffice, was done for the most part with taxes.

In keeping with the Marxist-Leninist tendency, the maintenance and reestablishment of the ability to work stand as the focal point. Highly developed, accordingly, is the company health care system with company hospitals and outpatient clinics, a system that is designed to guarantee uninterrupted care and prevention, but also control of employees (inability to work). In addition to these, there is the "territorial" ambulatory treatment in polyclinics and outpatient clinics and state-controlled medical and dental practices, and inpatient care in hospitals, whose functions go far beyond the practice in the West, since, because women have to a large extent been included in the earning process, the care of bed-ridden patients at home is practically impossible. Physicians have been urged to work in accordance with the so-called dispensary principle, by means of which an uninterrupted supervision of the state of health of all GDR citizens is to be assured through the maintenance of appropriate "sick files."

A distinction between the responsibility for the rendering of services, on the one hand, and the financing of services, on the other, such as there is in the FRG, does not exist, therefore. It follows that private practices have by now practically died out. The central control and the goal of uninterrupted "health supervision" of the entire population have led to a strong bureaucratization. The much lamented lack of physicians in the GDR can be attributed for the most part to the fact that many of them, instead of treating patients, are assigned to this bureaucracy.

Apparently pinning their hopes on a privatization of health care services are the Hanse-Merkur aG and the Hallesche Nationale aG, the only private health insurance companies to have thus far put out feelers in the GDR.

Physicians Associations Seek Private Practice

90EG0188B Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German
12 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by pt: "Strong Pressure From the Grass Roots: New Physicians Organizations Press for the Right To Establish Practices"]

[Text] Sat/Sun, 10/11 Feb—The greatest of pressure relative to a change in the state health system of the GDR is currently coming from medical doctors. Especially the physicians assigned to facilities for ambulatory treatment are pressing for the establishment of private practices.

As early as in late January an "Association of Physicians with Private Practices in Mecklenburg/Western Pomerania" was founded in Rostock, for example. The association, which has 30 members, is pressing for a structural

change of the health system. In its view, an optimum ambulatory care of the population can be guaranteed only by the increased approval of new free medical practices. In the GDR, the number of free practices which as a result of special provisions were allowed to settle accounts with the two GDR social insurances decreased, owing to deaths and retirement, to just a few hundred.

Recently, the number of free practices has been on the rise again. In Magdeburg alone, 16 physicians and four dentists received permission in January to open private practices. Three private practices were approved in Schwerin in January.

Also a driving force in the reform of the health care system is the newly founded Rudolf-Virchow-Association, which drew up its bylaws in early February and elected a managing committee. This association is demanding, among other things, a doubling of the money spent for health care by the GDR. In so doing, the physicians' association, which by now probably has around 9,000 members, pressed above all for an improvement in the working and living conditions of the physicians and the nursing staff. As soon as a government has emerged in the GDR as a result of free elections, the association intends to negotiate with it for the establishment of a self-administration by the physicians, along the lines of the board model in the FRG.

In keeping with an agreement reached with the Federal Board of Physicians in the FRG, the association also plans to work for a more effective distribution of donations of medical supplies to the health care facilities of the GDR. The Land Boards of Physicians in the FRG plan to report every incoming donation in the future to the Rudolf-Virchow-Association, so as to prevent an accumulation of donations, which are frequently awarded on the basis of partnerships.

The Marburg Association [Marburger Bund], the collective bargaining representative for physicians working in hospitals in the FRG, has meanwhile established a fund from which the various physicians' initiative groups are to receive a basic supply of technical and material aids. In this way, the organizational deficit of the new associations as compared to those in power to date is to be eliminated, according to the chairman, Frank Ulrich Montgomery.

POLAND

Regional Labor Market Changes, Unemployment Preparations

90EP0334A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish
No 4, 27 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Andrzej Mozolowski: "Unemployment"]

[Text] The runaway prices are evoking a general feeling of impending menace. However, it is mitigated by the

belief that this is a temporary matter; the government has promised to stifle inflation and then price stability, if only relative, will return. On the other hand, a new menace is penetrating the social awareness, a menace unknown until now, and not at all temporary: unemployment. For 40 years we were frightened with this capitalist calamity, which our socialist state broke with once and for all, although some economists and many managers yearned silently for this abomination. Now we will have to taste it. Although no one is happy about it, the prevailing opinion is that unemployment is the unavoidable byproduct of the process of healing the economy. Furthermore, that it is a normal, permanent element of every market economy, and therefore, of ours also.

Probably everybody agrees with this. With the exception of those who are threatened with loss of their job. And those who are afraid that this might happen to them in the future. Therefore, this "exception" is a lot of people. For we know, after all, that book publishing houses will fall like houses of cards, scores (hundreds?) of periodicals will disappear from the marketplace, and many bookshops, cinemas, and theaters will close their doors, as will crafts and cooperative establishments. In industry, hundreds of plants will bankrupt due to the finally true costs of energy and raw materials and the cost of credit and taxes. Others will defend themselves through relentlessly greater and more efficient production, and consequently, through dismissal of dispensable employees.

Those who think that they might lose their jobs often go into a panic. There is no point in explaining to them that there are enough jobs in Poland for everyone. That the reason a labor market is being created lies in the need to restructure employment, i.e., to move people from those factories where there are too many of them, to those areas which lack a labor force and are able to use them. Therefore, the unemployment will not be permanent. Anyone willing to work will not be without a job for very long, only for the couple of months needed to find a new job, or to obtain new skills, at the cost of the state, which will help in this. I repeat, there is no point in explaining this because in 40 years we have all become accustomed to thinking that we are entitled to a job, and that it is to seek us, and not we it. And here suddenly it turns out that it will be exactly the opposite. The sense of shock at the very thought of this is particularly strong in those people who have worked 20 or so years in the same institution and at the same desk. It is hard for them to imagine that they will have to part with it and look for work elsewhere, possibly in another occupation, which they will first have to learn. For many people, this may become a personal tragedy; we must realize this and respect it.

Reports coming in from throughout the country are unclear. There are a total of 25 voivodships whose employment departments have reported (as of 12 January), that the number of jobs open is 10 times higher than the number of jobseekers. But in Biala Podlaska, Kalisz, Konin and Sieradz voivodships, the traditional proportions are now reversed: the number of jobseekers is

greater than the number of job offers! This can be only partly ascribed to the recently voluntary reporting, by factories, of job openings, which until the end of last year was mandatory. Also, only partly for this reason the total number of job openings in Poland dropped from last year's quarter million to 70,000. In any case, all one needs to do is look in the newspapers: the announcements by enterprises seeking workers, which until recently dominated the columns of the press, have shrunk to a minimum.

During my visit in the Ministry of Labor (16 January) a telex arrived from Bydgoszcz: number of job openings in the voivodship, 347 (including 315 blue-collar jobs), and 1,260 jobseekers.

In many factories, dismissals have not yet begun, but neither are they taking on new employees. Employment is frozen until the enterprise knows what its tax situation will be, what the interest rate on credit will be in February, etc. I heard more and more frequently: In February the avalanche will start!

In Warsaw, job offers dropped from last year's 40,000 to 5,000. Blue-collar workers are sought almost exclusively: metalworkers, construction workers, drivers. Thus far, only 130 jobless were registered. But the employment department has already been notified that there will be dismissals at the Dairy Industry Institute, the Book Repository, the League of Women, and at design offices.

A few Krakow industrial plants have announced that they are dismissing 2,000 people.

For white-collar workers, including those with higher education, prospects are poor. But there are fields in which they are still needed. The post office needs them, the Social Security Agency, the State Insurance Bureau, treasury offices, and the health service. Thus, although prospects for office workers as a whole are poor, a secretary with a knowledge of languages, who can type and is able to operate telex and telefax machines, can always find a job. What is more, she can pick and choose.

No group dismissals have occurred just yet. It is still too early. Nothing has bankrupted yet; anyway, the plan for implementing bankruptcy procedures has just left the Council of Ministers. But one does not have to be a forecaster to predict the speedy beginning of large-scale processes of this type. Early in February? End of February? Or not until March?

As a certain director of employment, with the soul of a poet, replied when questioned by telephone: Mr Editor, the storm is drawing near. Meanwhile, we are seeing the lightning, signaling its approach...

Who Is an Unemployed Person?

How high will the unemployment be? No one knows. The government estimates the unemployment at 400,000 people. The World Bank suggests 1.5 million. The first figure is pulled from the air, the second is based

on the experience of countries completely different from ours, where during the course of deep restructuring approximately 15 percent of the occupationally active people lost their jobs.

An explanation is in order here: These figures do not mean, as many people believe, that there will be in Poland at any time an army of jobless totaling, e.g., 400,000 people (assuming the first variant), or 1.5 million (the second variant). These figures only say how many people will be registered at a labor office during the course of a year. Assuming that the average time spent looking for a job or training in a new occupation does not exceed 3 months, the figures given above should be divided by four in order to obtain the average number of people without jobs.

What is the definition of an "unemployed" person? The question is not at all trivial. So: In the eyes of the law, a legal, registered person, entitled to draw unemployment benefits, is any Pole, able and willing to work, who does not receive an annuity or pension, does not have a farm or other steady source of income (for the lawyers: can, under this law, an underage boy or girl be an unemployed person?).

The applicant for benefits must register at the labor office and if he does not find a suitable offer there, after a month he receives his first benefit, which is equal to 70 percent of his previous pay (the amount that his vacation pay had been). After 3 months this unemployment benefit drops, for the next 6 months, to 50 percent of the previous pay, and then to 40 percent, with no time limit. However, a limitation has been placed on the size of the benefit: It cannot exceed the amount of the average national wage. The intent here was that an unemployed director, for example, should not receive a million-zlotys benefit.

An unemployed person who had not worked before, will receive a benefit equal to the lowest wage, unless he is a graduate of a vocational school; then the benefit will rise to 150 percent of the minimum. But if he is a graduate of a higher school, it will rise to 200 percent of this sum.

In a case where there is absolutely no job which corresponds to the unemployed person's qualifications, the labor office can send him to a training course in an occupation for which there is a steady demand in a given region, and pay for this training.

Naturally, a benefit is not a pension which can be collected without end (although there are many who would like to do so throughout the entire world). The jobseeker is offered employment which corresponds with his qualifications; if he rejects two offers in a row, he loses his entitlement to benefits.

June Is Near!

I think that the outline presented above, although greatly abbreviated, describing the system for helping dismissed employees to find a job, fulfills a very useful role,

because until now, the ignorance on this subject has been universal and complete. The statements cited in the press of not only those in danger of being terminated but also their directors, evoke sorrow and grief. ("Are we the ones who are supposed to ensure that our terminated employees have a job?" "What are we supposed to pay these benefits out of?", etc.).

Let us add that the entire financial burden of paying the benefits, the costs of training, etc., will be borne by the newly created Labor Fund, which took over the Vocational Mobilization and Retraining Fund money left over from last year. It will draw further money from the contributions made by all employers, without exception, plus contributions to the Social Security Agency. (Another thing, the government should decide once and for all, whether this is to be 1 percent or 2 percent.)

Let us also add that the employment services will be completely reorganized. In place of the present employment departments, by June, a network of regional labor offices will be established. Over them will be the voivodship labor offices, and at the top, in the Ministry of Labor, a Chief Employment Council will be formed.

The new law has already been written. We still do not have a new apparatus. The employment offices, therefore, are improvising. And they have increasingly more work and it will come in avalanches. Not only proportionally to the growing movement in business, but also because of the growing scale of the tasks. Still this mass of clients will be made up of individual people, who must be treated individually. For most of these "new" jobless, a job change may be a shock, a change of occupation may appear to be an insoluble problem, and learning at their age may be a task beyond their strength. The labor office officials must understand all of this, and must help all of these people. They must also be able to distinguish the wheat from the chaff, because without a doubt, among the applicants for unemployment benefits will be those unemployed who are convinced that they do not need a job, just the benefits. They will use their free time to illegally wheel and deal, or work "off the books", or finally, do nothing, because, very simply, they do not like to work. Nor is it inconceivable that housewives, who do not have the slightest intention of taking any kind of job, will apply to the labor offices. They will try to extend their paid jobless status into infinity, they will claim that the offers are not suitable, this one because it is hard on the eyes, that one because she is allergic (a doctor's certificate can always be obtained), and will draw, from the Wage Fund, a supplement to her husband's earnings as long as she can.

Everywhere, in every part of the world, there are the "permanently unemployed," those people who are convinced that they do not have to work in order to live (in the FRG it is estimated that there are approximately 300,000 such, out of 1.9 million jobless). Nevertheless, we should do what we can to make sure that as few of them as possible live at our expense.

Thus, a labor office official must be as wily as a snake, as hard as a diamond, and as understanding as a mother—depending on need. And these professional staffs have to be trained quickly, because the meager workforces in the present employment departments will not be able to cope. June is not far away.

Telephones Will Function?!

All of this turmoil in the employment area will fulfill, in addition to its basic economic goal, another social task, well understood by all. Because, after all, everyone curses the murderous queues at the post office and in PKO (Polish Savings Bank), swears at the irregular and inadequate bus service (because of lack of drivers), the slowly meandering letters (lack of mail carriers), often suffers because of the disastrous shortage of nurses and nurses aides in the hospitals and registration clerks in the clinics, rages at the out-of-order telephones (not enough repairmen), at the unremoved trash, dirty streets, at the roads, dug up for months at a time.

The labor market should deal with this. Will we live to see the day when all of these jobs are in demand? Perhaps, when everyone becomes poor, work itself will become something that is valuable and respected, and a young person will not begin an interview with an employer by asking whether he will receive such-and-such an amount of money, because if not, it does not pay him to work.

A skeptic may remark that the above-mentioned institutions, suffering from this disastrous shortage of labor, are also suffering from lack of money. Where will they get it from?

There is an answer to this, too. The law, prepared hastily but nevertheless wisely and with foresight (the authors deserve praise), also provides for such an eventuality. It includes a paragraph on "intervention work." This refers to work which is especially essential in a given area for social reasons, precisely the kind of work mentioned above. And it is there, to the hospitals, post office, etc., that the labor office can send its clients, refunding to these institutions, for a period of 6 months, the money they spend on wages for the newly employed.

Finally, we must call attention to still one more advantage of a labor market. The discipline factor, which teaches us integrity and respect for a job. The fear of losing it has its pedagogical value. Our politicians and moralists heatedly reject this, saying that this is not the way to build a work ethos and the authors did not have this goal in mind at all when they created the new employment system. This is obviously untrue. I tend rather to agree with the Episcopate's New Year's message, in which it called upon the nation to do battle with the laziness and loafing so rampant in Poland. Perhaps the bishops had prayer in mind. But I believe that not all of the work can be left to God.

Businesses Adopt New Tactics To Ward off Bankruptcy, Encourage Sales

90EP0397A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 7, 17 Feb 90 pp 1-5

[Article by Jerzy Baczynski: "Where Do These Stairs Lead?" surtitled "February Will Be More Difficult Than January"]

[Text] Now that several weeks have elapsed since the government economic program was introduced, we can afford a discreet sigh of relief. For the time being nothing that would nullify the chances for the success of the Balcerowicz Plan has happened, and that in itself already is some success. The public has responded extremely calmly to the drastic decline in real wages and the prices have begun to stabilize after their strenuous climb in the first weeks of January, while the wage freeze proved to be more effective than had been assumed, the exchange rate of the dollar maintained an admirable stability, and labor discipline rose explicitly under the threat of unemployment.... On the other hand, though... well, precisely: the output decline in January was greater than assumed by pessimistic scenarios, and the forecasts for February are even worse. What are we to think of it all? Where do these stairs lead?

Let us begin with facts, that is, with the economic situation in January. The government clearly underestimated the inflationary effects of its own decisions to raise energy prices and the hard-currency exchange rates and to abolish subsidies and price controls. An inflation of the order of 40 percent was expected, but the actual inflation certainly exceeded 70 percent and the prices of manufactured consumer goods increased by about 90 percent in January.

Every government likes to lower forecasts of inflation in order not to wake the sleeping dogs, because, as known, these forecasts serve as guidance to producers when determining the prices of their products and raising them a little more for greater security. But lowering the inflationary forecasts also could have another meaning: namely, the government announced that the savings (and loan) interest rates will correspond to the rate of inflation—although, to be more honest, it should have explained that it meant anticipated and not actual inflation. The [anticipated] 36-percent inflation in January means that the [actual] decline in the value of savings was compensated only in half. But on the other hand, had the government assumed a higher inflation rate in advance, the interest on loans would be so high as to make them practically unavailable, because even a 40-percent monthly interest would be too high to be afforded by most enterprises. I am not claiming that 40 percent was deliberately specified, because it may really be that the computers at the Ministry of Finance had computed January inflation at 40 percent.

The fact that price increases in the first weeks of 1990 were higher than assumed need not be reason to worry. If some people were losers thereby, that is too bad, because

in return we have the opportunity to rapidly choke off inflation. Producers hiked their prices so horrendously that these almost immediately turned out to be in their disfavor.

Immediately after the new year producers followed their old habit: they figured out the rise in costs, added their profits, and passed on the thus calculated sales prices to trade. Trade added its surcharge and proposed to consumers new retail prices. But this time the proposition was not accepted, for the simple reason that people ran out of money. Had producers been more restrained in raising prices, the collision with the demand barrier would have occurred somewhat later and been less painful. But as things are, already after a few weeks, the warehouses of most enterprises are chockfull with unsold inventories and here and there production had to be halted and the workforces given a collective leave.

All this happened so rapidly that the management and workers still do not know how to react. Only a few are trying to cut prices and costs, let alone lay off employees. The others are waiting and hoping that sales may increase, that credit will be cheaper, that some export contract will be obtained, and that perhaps, once the first price shock passes, people will again buy shoes, clothing, and television sets. Unfortunately, nothing indicates that the good old times when supply exceeded demand and anything could be sold at arbitrary prices will return to the market.

That is because the Balcerowicz Plan has so far proved to be highly effective in the area in which all the previous anti-inflation programs were unsuccessful: it has halted wage increases. The January statistics, which I had awaited with great anxiety, seem simply improbable. In the first month of 1990, compared with December 1989, wages in five principal branches of the economy increased by barely 1.3 percent. In the presence of, I note again, a roughly 70-percent increase in prices at that! This means (I should again use the exclamation mark) that real wages in January declined by 40 percent. Nothing like that has been recorded in European history for decades, and even throughout the world it is difficult to find a precedent for it. How did this "success" come about, a "success" that within a month made of us poverty-stricken people who barely earn enough for a living, but which also has slain the dragon of inflation?

The government incorporated in the financial system of enterprises a brutal wage tax (the so-called *neopopiwiek* [a tax on wage increases]), levied whenever an enterprise dared to raise wages above a fixed ceiling (30 percent of the inflation rate in January and 20 percent from February to April). Accordingly the wages, without the punitive tax, could legally have increased by only about 20 percent in January. But actually they increased by 1.3 percent. It can be seen clearly, that for the first time in my memory, enterprises paid lower wages than they could? Why? Because they could not. This is not a play on words: they were free to pay more, but most often they lacked the wherewithal. Let us dwell on this phenomenon a bit longer.

I have already mentioned that nearly the entire industry was painfully affected by the decline in demand on the domestic market, and this has most strongly affected (for the time being) the consumer industries. Owing to the drastic increases in food prices at the beginning of the year, most households (as indicated by CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center] polls), being uncertain as to whether they would have enough money in January, curtailed, just in case, their purchases of manufactured consumer goods. After all, one can wear the same shoes and jacket for a month or two longer, while washing machines and furniture should not be bought precisely in a period of greatest uncertainty about prices. Eighty percent of households curtailed or halted their purchases of manufactured consumer goods.

The second reason for the decline in demand is the price policy of the producers themselves, who as it were ignored the coming danger. Yet another, and perhaps decisive, reason is the standstill in orders from trade, especially from wholesale trade, which is terrified by the high loan interest rates. Only goods with a rapid turnover were accepted for sale, and these declined in volume with time. These mechanisms reinforced each other, causing a decline in sales, and hence also in revenues, at enterprises. Moreover, even the revenues have been hard to obtain owing to the delays in payments. Among other things, that was a reason why many producers decided to sell their own products off trucks (faster access to revenues, lower prices by discounting the trade's profit margin). That is how one economic foundation of the last few weeks was born: sales from trucks.

The Road From a Work Leave to Unemployment

It was not only owing to lack of funds that the management paid lower wages than it was permitted. Another phenomenon is that drastic wage claims ceased to be contested. From my conversations with several factory managers I learned that the workforces, feeling scared by the specter (whether genuine or not) of plant bankruptcies, displayed extremely restrained behavior. It is a paradox that this cost element was easier to rein in whereas the enterprises could exert no influence on the prices of materials, transportation, energy, etc. So then, wage increases were withheld also because they could be withheld. What is more, in such a situation labor discipline even increased. The number of sickness leaves in January was one-half the normal. The psychosis of unemployment began to operate.

I say "psychosis," because so far real unemployment has not yet appeared. The figure of 56,000 unemployed cited in official January communiques is to a large extent due to defects in our job placement system as well as to lack of experience in the registration and handling of the unemployed. Classical, collective layoffs have been few so far, although both the management and the plant trade union organizations are signaling that they may begin soon. However, in this case, too, we are still in the waiting stage. Enterprise management still expects that it may yet dispense with victims, that in the end the

government—as so often in the past—being terrified by the specter of economic collapse, will “loosen the purse strings” and give some subsidies.

Despite the standstill in sales the reactions of enterprises are rather shallow and tardy. Most often they do the simplest thing by periodically suspending production and sending their workforces away on leave. Cost cutting, price cutting, changes in production and marketing, and layoffs are measures to which most enterprises still are not resorting. Of a certainty this was meant by a deputy minister of industry when he recently declared that the enterprises will begin to experience real difficulties only in February. For it will no longer be possible to delay painful decisions. The World Bank estimates that by year end unemployment in Poland may reach about 1,000,000. (Minister Syryjczyk explained that the scale of unemployment will also depend on personal attitudes—whether people would agree, e.g., to work part-time or to accept partial wages or prefer the status of an unemployed person.) At present a majority of government economists believe that unemployment will be higher than assumed (400,000). Why? Because everything indicates that the decline in output will be much greater than anticipated.

The Economy Is Shrinking

In January in socialized industry the volume of sales was 20-percent lower than a year ago, of which as much as 40 percent lower in food industry and 30 percent in light industry. According to the forecasts of the Central Planning Office, output in February will decline by an additional 20-50 percent depending on the subsector. Consider that the government program assumed an output decline of five to seven percent for the entire year 1990. This output decline is precisely the most troubling aspect of the first few weeks of the application of the Balcerowicz Plan. It should be added at once that an output decline is unavoidable in the presence of such a drastic inflation cure based on curtailing consumer demand, enterprises, and the state budget. But did it have to be as great as it looks to be?

The minister of industry who was asked this question on television answered that no decline in output should be regretted because, wherever it was unprofitable, inefficient, and subsidized, this is rather a manifestation of economic recovery. But our problem is that we do not know whether it is precisely the bad plants that are menaced by bankruptcy or by a major decline in output. In light industry, for example, the decline in output affected nearly every enterprise regardless of its productivity or technological or organizational level. The industry working for the needs of agriculture is operating at barely half-capacity owing to the decline in demand by farmers. The prospects for the investment industry are dramatic, because the economic recession may in general result in a stoppage of orders for many of its enterprises. Likewise, owing to the curtailment of sales, the high loan interest rate, and the high taxes, thousands of private-sector plants have already either shut down or suspended

production. Surely in this case, too, there is no reason for regretting every shut-down plant, because many of them usually and parasitically exploited the market imbalances, but if part after part is added to form the whole picture, it will be seen that a decline in output by, e.g., 20 percent in 1990 would take several years to make up.

The Anteroom to Limbo

Soon—in February? in March?—the first bankruptcies of large enterprises should take place. How will the government react? For the time being it looks like it will not hasten to the rescue (although organizations for providing financial support to enterprises with the potential for successful restructuring have been established). But even assuming that our entire industry, from the Ursus [Tractor Plant] to the FSO [Passenger Car Factory], is worthless and deserves bankruptcy, there exist certain limits dictated by the country's economic security and admissible unemployment. Even now, in the presence of the liberalization of foreign trade, it turns out that many Polish factories cannot withstand price competition with foreign producers. Should they be shut down? Then what will we pay for Japanese television sets and Italian shoes with? For all the gratification that may be felt in witnessing the humiliation of our industry (which has for so many years been humiliating consumers), it must be given time to adapt itself to the new conditions or to prove that it cannot adapt.

Take the light industry as an example. It is conceivable that, given such a large decline in real wages, most consumers will refrain for an additional two to three months from buying, e.g., clothing or shoes. What factory can survive this? Hence also some people already are saying that, inasmuch as the decline in real wages was too substantial in January, greater than assumed in the Balcerowicz Plan, this month the wage controls should be relaxed a bit in order to stimulate consumer demand. This makes some sense, considering that in January we overfulfilled by two months the plan for sacrifices. But on the other hand... Now that the anti-inflation program has been in operation for several weeks, it is definitely premature to trumpet its success and lift the foot off the brake. Inflation may escape control in the presence of the least inattention, particularly in view of the output decline. In the meantime the enterprises having problems in selling their products domestically should try exporting (in addition to, of course, stimulating domestic sales by price cutting, sales on the installment plan, advertising, etc.). The export variant seems logical; besides, at the beginning of the year, a majority of the plant managers polled by POLITYKA predicted increased emphasis on exports, being additionally encouraged by the new exchange rate of the dollar. But now something has happened that I cannot fully understand.

In January, according to GUS [Main Statistical Administration] data, exports were 16-percent lower than a year ago—despite the marked devaluation of the zloty, the reduction of import barriers through the introduction of

internal currency convertibility, and the inventories available. If we accept the explanation that the new exchange rate of the dollar does not assure profitable exports, this is extremely disturbing, because each week that the stable exchange rate of currencies is maintained (in the presence of a soaring inflation of the zloty) the profitability of exports is declining still further. Or perhaps the reason is that the abolition of export incentives (tax exemptions, retained foreign-exchange earnings) resulted in that the enterprises cannot accept for their products a hard-currency price that would at least assure offsetting their operating costs? We shall see what happens in February. The fact that imports too are lower than a year ago (although today they can be paid for in zlotys!) prophesies well for the stability of the exchange rate of the dollar but at the same time confirms that a general decline in economic activity has taken place.

The government regards, as we know, the most urgent and important economic task the mastering of inflation or rather already of hyperinflation leading directly to

destruction of the economy. Following the experience of January we can assume success of this part of the program, or at any rate we are nearer to this goal, particularly considering that, despite the 40-percent decline in living standards, the society continues to display great patience and trust in the government. But January is only the beginning of the road. In the very near future the principal problem will become, of a certainty, enterprise bankruptcies and growing unemployment. And afterward another challenge awaits us: how to halt the decline in output and revive the expiring economy, and in such a manner as to avoid a new turn of the inflationary spiral?

Contrary to certain declarations of government members, I want to warn against the somewhat naive belief that the time of sacrifices will last only several months. The suppression of inflation, if it succeeds, will merely provide better conditions for a prolonged and painful restructuring of the economy. We are in an economic limbo, and thence, it is said, stairs lead either up or down.

POLAND

Inability To Cope With Environmental Deterioration in Silesia Noted

90EP0358A Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI
in Polish No 45-46, 5-12 Nov 89 p 10

[Letter by Piotr Wojciechowski: "Self-Genocide?"]

[Text] Yesterday morning I returned from a short visit in Silesia. I was mainly in Bytom where I had been invited to take part in Christian Culture Week. I was also in Sosnowiec, Katowice and Chorzow.

I returned full of thoughts as black as coal. The ecological disaster is growing worse, the water, air and soil are worse, and the effects of the damage done by mining are deepening the feeling of devastation. I talked with ecologists about the thousand-percent violations of safety standards and with physicians about the fact that there are areas in which every fourth pregnancy ends with a stillborn child, and that among those born, over 20 percent show greater or lesser permanent impairment or handicap. Teachers told me that there is a growing percentage of children who will never be able to go beyond the fifth grade of elementary school. Priests told me about periods of smog, following which it was not possible to keep up with the number of funerals, and the chapel could not accommodate the number of caskets. Silesia kills slowly. The extermination here is not, after all, a goal, but the byproduct of extraction, smelting, processing, storing and enrichment. Death, suffering, the wrong done to handicapped children and their families, all of these are silently accepted assumptions of technological processes and economic calculations. Silesia kills slowly—and such very good and friendly people. After the sharp, derisively competitive atmosphere of the Warsaw throngs, Silesia appears to be a land of friendly and calm people, deeply engrossed in their daily activities, in minor family and neighborhood events. Of course, my brief visit does not give me the right to generalize too freely, but I got the impression that here they look at the crazy acrobatics of contemporary politics from a kind of distance, with a mixture of submissiveness and disbelief. This submissiveness, this fatalistic acceptance of the black sky, the stinking water in the faucet, the darkening walls of the houses—all of this appeared to me to be most dangerous and most inhumane. On the square in front of the train station in Katowice, Solidarity is selling its books and cassettes. Next to them the Confederation for an Independent Poland people have their stall under a large banner. A step farther down the short street there is the private initiative—someone is selling postcards with bible verses, opposite are other brochures about palmistry, hypnosis, vegetarian cookery, healing with herbs, and also Solidarity stamps, good-luck charms, and little pendulums.

I saw no "Greens" stalls. The ecologists at Silesian University have heard nothing about grass-roots ecological movements. They themselves are helpless against

industry, which has a lot of money to spend on professional reports but does not like it when these reports tell the truth, and is able to be vindictive when too much noise is made about the alarming indicators and statistics. When I tell them about a plan to cover all of Europe with a single network of stations studying the state of pollution and the output of pollution sources, a network independent of large industrial organizations and governments, they simply shrug their shoulders: Who will give the money for this?

The people from the Community Educational Society are also helpless. They deplore the fact that parents are not eager to organize community schools, that the Silesian intelligentsia is so dispersed and reserved, that the Society finds it difficult to reach them. Everyone understands the most urgent need for schools with dormitories which would make it possible to take children for at least a couple of months a year to those areas which are the least polluted. But there are the costs... But who is to organize this? For many children, all of this is already too late; their fate was decided in the first 10 or 12 weeks of the mother's pregnancy. Who is there to help the future mothers by arranging a trip for them out of the most-endangered region? Who will arrange leaves of absences for them?

The Nazi concentration camps killed people, first taking away their dignity. The people in Silesia are living, suffering and dying, maintaining their human dignity in their way. But I am not at all sure that their human dignity is respected.

The factories which poison the water, soil and air pay penalties for polluting. They delay, they finagle, but they pay. If anyone thinks that collecting a fine settles anything, he is wrong. First, a negligible amount of the money collected goes for removing the damage and preventing further damage. Second, the size of the penalty is in no way related to the actual, full dimensions of the losses which society and the community suffers. If we wanted to make things right, every poisoner would have to compensate for the full amount of the losses, i.e., an amount which would include the costs of restoring the environment to its previous state, as well as the costs of ecological research, information, penalty enforcement, etc. What would be the consequence of this? The poisoning enterprise would include "ecological" costs into the costs of the final product. The product would be much more expensive, which could have two different effects. In an orders-directive economy, all it would do is to increase inflation, thereby making the standard-of-living situation worse. In an open economy, the less-polluting factories would win out in the competition, and the worst polluters and damagers would bankrupt one after the other. The economists would not be the opponents of the ecologists, because the development of ecological research, the "clean technologies," the renewable sources of energy, would stimulate economic development. The Polish mine which would include in the cost of coal all of the items in the "ecological account," together with compensation for the loss of reserve

deposits (now coal lying at a depth of a few hundred meters is regarded as belonging to no one, and free), would most certainly bankrupt—but it would bankrupt rightly, sensibly, and to the benefit of society. How soon can we expect such a happy event, and what, then, will we heat our houses with?

I do not know, but I think we are striving for an open economy. I think that heavy industry does not have to be an instrument of mass suicide, self-genocide. I am in favor of asking questions, even if the answers to them are unimaginable. In thinking, there is no retroactivity.

I am in favor of asking questions and for a long time I have wanted to ask some questions on the subject of Polish emigration today. Now I have someone to ask. With all due respect, I am addressing them to our minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Namely, I am asking whether everything has been done to prevent the inhumane manner, a manner offensive to human dignity, with which Polish citizens applying for travel visas are treated in the consular offices. I am not one of those people who look at the queues and mobs of people in front of the embassies with contempt and satisfaction. I do not say: "That's what they wanted, that's what they have. They're looking for an easy life

abroad, let them stand in the mud. Let them look dolefully at the soaked letters they are holding. Let them sleep in their cars and in the bus shelters."

These are Polish citizens. Free people who want to take advantage of the human rights guaranteed them by the UN. The sovereign, wealthy countries do not have to take immigrants. They can refuse to issue visas, they can raise the requirements, they can increase the price of a visa, etc. But they have to be reminded that these people should be treated humanely. For sovereign, wealthy countries this is not an organizational problem—the elimination of the humiliating queues. The issuance of visas can be computerized, the size of the staff can be increased, numbers can be handed out, information can be expanded, and more visa offices can be set up by leasing additional space. The petitioners will bear the costs of these improvements. Mr. Minister, please protect our citizens from ill treatment. I am sure that you do not believe that these nights spent standing in queues will discourage people from trying to leave. Anyone that persistent will leave anyway. And if those standing in queues feel that their fatherland demanded that they be treated with human dignity, and if they are also treated with friendliness and care at the Polish consular offices abroad, maybe they will return.

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